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Abstract – English 
In the last 25 years, Europe’s growth rate has slowed continuously, while globalization 
and emerging countries have put the old continent’s countries in front to new 
challenges. The 2008 recession, in particular, highlighted even more the 
dysfunctionality of some EU labour markets: different from each other, fragmented and 
rigid. The need for reforms appeared crystal clear to governments and supranational 
institutions. 
This work has a twofold aim: first, to review the vast literature about labour market and 
its institutions to investigate whether or else there is an “optimal” set of institutions and 
policies; second, to review the labour market reforms implemented in selected European 
countries and to evaluate them in the wider framework of the European debate on 
flexicurity. The goal is to contribute to the debate on the actual feasibility and  meaning 
of international comparisons aimed at defining an “optimal” setting of labour market 
institutions. 
Corcerning the first goal, it has not been found an “optimal” set of institutions, as the 
labour market performances appear to be influenced by a number of variables, many of 
which are country –specific. 
Regarding employment performances, what resulted from the comparison is a dual 
situation: while countries like Great Britain and Germany, that implemented the reforms 
before the downturn, actually seem to have realized flexicurity, Southern Europe 
countries are facing greater rigidities in their labour markets and seem to be neglecting 
the initiatives related to job and income security, focusing, instead, on flexibility, thus 
creating dual and unequal labour markets. The analysis of reforming processes reveals, 
instead, that each country is following its own path, based not only on labour market 
institutions, but also on a number of other economic and social variables. 
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Abstract – Italiano 
Negli ultimi venticinque anni il tasso di crescita in Europa ha continuamente rallentato, 
mentre la globalizzazione e le economie emergenti hanno posto le nazioni del vecchio 
continente di fronte a nuove sfide. La recessione iniziata nel 2008 ha sottolineato in 
modo ancora più evidente le disfunzionalità dei mercati del lavoro europei: diversi uno 
dall’altro, frammentati e rigidi. La necessità di riforme è apparsa chiara ai governi 
nazionali e alle istituzioni sovranazionali. 
Questa tesi ha un doppio obiettivo: per prima cosa, la presentazione di una parte della 
vasta letteratura economica che si occupa dell’occupazione e del mercato del lavoro, 
con lo scopo di stabilire se esista o meno un mercato del lavoro “ottimale”; in secondo 
luogo,la narrazione storica delle riforme del mercato del lavoro in alcuni Paesi europei 
selezionati e di valutarle nel più ampio contesto del dibattito europeo sulla flexicurity. 
L’obiettivo è quello di dare un contributo al dibattito sulla fattibilità e sull’opportunità 
di condurre confronti tra Paesi, che hanno lo scopo di individuare la combinazione 
ottimale di politiche del mercato del lavoro. 
Per quanto concerne l’esistenza o meno di un mercato del lavoro ottimale, il risultato 
pare essere negativo: le performance del mercato del lavoro sono influenzate da 
numerosi fattori, dipendenti sia dal mercato stesso, sia dal contesto economico più in 
generale. La situazione “ottima” per un Paese, dunque, dipende da elementi strettamente 
country – specific. 
Per quanto riguarda le performance, il risultato è una situazione duale: mentre alcuni 
Paesi come il Regno Unito e la Germania, che hanno implementato le riforme prima 
della crisi, hanno davvero realizzato il paradigma della flexicurity, alcuni Paesi 
dell’Europa meridionale stanno affrontando maggiori rigidità e sembrano trascurare le 
iniziative mirate alla sicurezza del lavoro e del reddito, creando così mercati del lavoro 
duali e iniqui. Per quanto concerne, invece, i processi di riforma, l’analisi rivela che 
ogni Paese sta seguendo il proprio percorso, basato non solo sulle istituzioni del 
mercato del lavoro, ma anche su una serie di altre variabili economiche e sociali. 
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Introduction 
The objective of this work is to review some of the reforms of the labour market 
occurred in Europe from 2003 onwards and their main results.  
Needless to say, labour market conditions are very important, as work affects the life of 
households, who in turn are the basis of society, as consumers, taxpayers, service 
recipients and workers. It is no surprise, therefore that ‘labour market reforms’ have 
been the object of lively debates, especially in Europe. 
During the 1990s, Europe suffered from a quite high unemployment, due also to the 
1992-’93 and the 1997-’98 downturns. Many welfare and unemployment insurance 
systems proved to be effective in reducing the social cost of the lack of work, but were 
heavy in terms of public finances and often created disincentives toward the return to 
work, so they basically failed to improve employment and labour productivity. 
Therefore, from the beginning of the new millennium, several European countries 
reformed their labour markets and UI systems, with the common principles of back-to-
work incentives and make-work-pay framework. These reforms were often focused on 
active labour market policies (ALMPs – activation of the unemployed) through better 
counseling, training and subsidies when taking on a job, but also PLMPs were improved 
to limit dependence on subsidies and dead-weight effects.  
The severe crisis occurred at the end of 2007 heavily hit Europe. Automatic stabilizers 
and labour policies were implemented and reformed. Labour markets in different 
countries reacted to the recession in quite different ways, and this was partly due to 
different labour market institutions. 
Labour markets in Europe, despite the EMU, are still regulated at the national level and 
therefore differ greatly about procedures and policies. Nevertheless, the EU influences 
policies with various supranational objectives: productivity has to increase, public 
finances must be sustainable, and labour-specific objectives have been set by the Europe 
2020 agenda. All these issues obviously have an impact on national labour markets, 
through the channels of hiring-and-firing rules, of subsidies, of product market 
regulation, of retirement age and so on.  
Moreover, after the 2007 crisis, it is clear that EMU lacks a fiscal coordination, which 
could instead be crucial to address labour market failures and future downturns.  
 Introduction 
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Therefore, several experts and institutions are considering a European Unemployment 
Insurance scheme, which would harmonize the automatic fiscal stabilizers of member 
countries. 
In this work, I will review the main European countries’ policies and reforms, with the 
aim to detect best practices and disincentives created by both active and passive labour 
market policies. I will also try to highlight the role of economic integration in the 
national reform processes, trying to understand if some issues would be better targeted 
if dealt with at a supranational level, a topic that has returned in focus after the recent 
economic recession. 
The work is organized as follows: Part 1 presents the economic and econometric 
analysis of the different labour markets observed in Europe; in Chapter 1 some theoretic 
concepts and models are presented, along with an historical framework; in Chapter 2 I 
tried to detect regularities in recent labour market reforms and policies, while 
registering differences as well. In Chapter 3, the impact of the Great Recession was 
taken into account, to investigate the way labour market institutions influenced 
European countries’ reactions to the crisis. In Part 2 I conducted an historic review of 
the reforming paths of some selected European countries. Finally, the Conclusions 
represent impressions and opinions that I developed personally during the research 
work. 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PART 1: Labour market institutions and economic performance 
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Chapter 1: Labour markets in macroeconomic theory 
1. Theoretical framework 
1.1. The concept of unemployment 
Unemployment is the major problem that labour market policies attempt to tackle. It can 
be defined, in the common language, as the number of people in a particular country or 
area who cannot get a job
1
. More specifically, it is defined as the number of people in 
working age who are without a job, but who would work at current wages.
2
   
This definition, however, suffers from an imprecision about the unit of measure, as it is 
unable to distinguish between people that are partially unemployed and people that are 
totally unemployed. Therefore, a more precise definition is the difference between the 
amount of working hours worked in a certain period of time and the amount that the 
whole working force would work at the current wages
3
. 
A univocal definition of unemployment, as well as of other labour topics, is important 
to grant international comparability of statistics. Thus, every five years, the International 
Conference of Labour Statisticians (ICLS) is convened by the International Labour 
Organization
4
 (ILO) to set international standards on the various topics of labour 
statistics. 
As unemployment is commonly used as an overall indicator of the current performance 
of countries, it is particularly important to agree on the definition. The international 
definition, adopted by the ICLS, is based on the following criteria, which have to be 
present simultaneously: (i) “without work”; (ii) “currently available for work”; 
(iii)“seeking work”5 in a specified recent period (usually the past month or the past four 
weeks). This set of criteria is usually referred to as to the activity principle. 
                                                         
1
 Longman, Dictionary of Contemporary English, page 1806. 
2
 J. Sloman, Essentials of Economics, Harlow, Pearson, 2004, in the Italian edition from il Mulino. 
3
 C. Napoleoni et al., Dizionario di Economia Politica, Edizioni di Comunità, Milano, 1956. 
4
 The International Labour Organization, founded in 1919, is a specialized UN agency that aims at 
“promoting social justice and internationally recognized human and labour rights, pursuing its founding 
mission that labour peace is essential to prosperity” (quote from ilo.org).  
5
 Hussmann R. (1989).  
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“Seeking work” must be an objective criterion; thus, the definition of unemployment 
provides examples of active steps to seek work: registration at a public or private 
employment exchange; application to employers; checking at worksites, farms, factory 
gates, market or other assembly places; placing or answering newspaper advertisements; 
seeking assistance of friends or relatives; looking for land, building, machinery or 
equipment to establish one’s own enterprise; arranging for financial resources; applying 
for permits and licenses; etc
6
. These steps can be both formal and informal and refer to 
paid employment and also to self-employment. 
 
1.2. Activity and inactivity 
The currently active population is defined by ICLS as “all persons above a specified 
minimum age (e.g. 15 years) who, during a specified brief period of one week or one 
day, fulfill the requirements for inclusion among the employed or unemployed. 
Therefore, not all those who do not work are unemployed: there are also inactive 
people. The inactive are not included in the labour force. To ensure that each person is 
included in one and only one of the three main categories, a set of priority rules is set by 
the ILO: the first category to be defined is the “employed” category (persons above the 
specified age that are either working or temporarily absent from work in the reference 
period); then, the “unemployed” are identified; finally, inactive people fall out 
residually. 
Inactivity can be defined as the situation in which a person is neither employed, nor 
unemployed, thus he/she does not have a job, but does not search for one. This category 
is difficult to measure and evaluate, since there are many reasons for inactivity, e.g. 
retirement, engagement in family duties, or other personal reasons. Some of these 
people are the so-called discouraged workers, people who gave up searching for a job, 
because they simply do not believe that there is a job available for them. 
Among the inactive there is a particular category, called NEET
7
, the young inactive. 
This group has to be correctly measured and targeted as it registers high probabilities of 
social exclusion, poverty and skill loss. Many policies designed for the young (grants, 
                                                         
6
 Hussmann (1989) page 14.  
7
 Not in Employment, Education or Training. 
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subsidies for firms, dedicated contracts, etc…) have precisely the aim of reducing the 
number of the NEET.  
 
1.3. Measurement of employment and unemployment and related issues  
As already reported above, international standards are set by ILO to measure topics of 
labour statistics in a comparable way.  
One basic concept highlighted by ILO to fully understand the other labour statistics 
definitions is that of production boundary:  “activities carried out under the control and 
responsibility of institutional units (i.e. non-financial and financial corporations, 
government units, non-profitable institutions, and household including unincorporated 
enterprises owned by households) that use inputs of labour, capital and goods and 
services to produce outputs of goods and services”8. This definition is particularly 
important to separate services meant for the market from household domestic and 
personal services not produced for the market, which undoubtedly contribute to 
economic welfare, but have no suitable market price and would modify substantially the 
concept and dimensions of concept such as unemployment and inactivity, making them 
virtually non-existing. 
From the concept of production stems the definition of active population: “the 
economically active population comprises all persons of either sex who furnish the 
supply of labour for the production of economic goods and services, […], during a 
specified time-reference period”9. Active population includes both the employed and the 
unemployed, as long as the activity principle
10
 cited above is respected.   
Data to build labour market statistics are collected through households surveys, labour 
force surveys (LFS), population censuses, but also from establishment sample surveys, 
economic censuses, social security records, public sector payrolls, or records on 
registered job seekers or recipients of benefits. Concerning surveys in particular, design 
                                                         
8
 Definition by System of National Accounts (SNA). 
9
 Definition by System of National Accounts (SNA). 
10
 The international definition of unemployment, adopted by the ICLS, is based on the following criteria, 
which have to be present simultaneously: (i) “without work”; (ii) “currently available for work”; (iii) 
“seeking work”10 in a specified recent period (usually the past month or the past four weeks). 
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of the survey is crucial to obtain reliable datasets: respondents may have a different 
concept of economic activity, thus providing imprecise data.  
Eurostat data about active, unemployed and inactive population in the European Union 
and in the biggest countries are reported respectively in Table 1, in Table 2 and in Table 
3. 
 
 
Active population (as a 
percentage of the 
working age population) 
2015 – 1st quarter 
EU 27 72.2% 
France 71.5% 
Germany 77.6% 
Italy 63.9% 
Spain 74.1% 
United Kingdom 76.7% 
Table 1. Source : europa.eu/eurostat, personal elaboration 
 
Unemployed (as a 
percentage of the active 
population) 
2015 – 1st quarter 
EU 27 10.1% 
France 10.8% 
Germany 5.0% 
Italy 13.0% 
Spain 23.8% 
United Kingdom 5.5% 
Table 2. Source : europa.eu/eurostat, personal elaboration 
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Inactive population (as a 
percentage of the 
working age population) 
2015 – 1st quarter 
EU 27 27.8% 
France 29.0% 
Germany 22.4% 
Italy 36.1% 
Spain 25.9% 
United Kingdom 23.3% 
Table 3. Source : europa.eu/eurostat, personal elaboration 
 
1.4.The Beveridge Curve 
A useful device to evaluate the nature of unemployment is the Beveridge curve
11
, which 
describes the negative relation that exists between the unemployment rate and the job-
vacancy rate. When vacancies increase, unemployment tends to decrease, thus the 
pattern takes the shape of a downward-sloping curve. Shifts in the curve may signal 
structural changes in unemployment, which usually require a revision of the policies. 
The curve is affected both by the level of efficiency in the labour market, 
demonstrating, therefore, the importance of the matching process in the correct 
functioning of the labour market on the one side, and by the business cycle on the other. 
Another important variable forming the intercept is the separation rate, i.e. the 
proportion of the total number of terminations of employment to the total number of 
workers employed. Separations may be of two types, voluntary quits or involuntary 
layoffs: several studies have highlighted that voluntary quits rise when economy is 
performing well, as a sign of the workers’ good expectations about the labour market, 
while layoffs and discharges are increase when the economy is performing poorly. 
Concerning the interpretation of the Beveridge Curve, while movements along the curve 
are usually interpreted as cyclical changes in unemployment, due to the different phases 
of the business cycle, shifts are considered signals of structural changes in the 
matching/hiring process in the economy. Observing the recent plotting of the US 
                                                         
11
 This curve was elaborated by J.C.R. Dow and L.A. Dicks-Mireaux in 1958 and was called Beveridge 
curve in the 1980s after William Henry Beveridge, who had studied the difficulties of the matching 
process in 1930s and 1940s. 
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Beveridge curve, Diamond and Sahin
12
 highlight an important policy implication of 
such an interpretation of shifts: in the case of a recession that increases unemployment, 
stabilization policies will be useful to lower it, but not to take the unemployment rate 
back to pre-crisis levels, as the labour market is presumed to be structurally deteriorated 
and less efficient from the hiring/matching point of view. Moreover, the authors 
recommend to check the curve over a long period of time, as considering only one 
business cycle, defined as the period between one expansion and the following one, 
does not allow to verify whether the rise in unemployment, which is normal during 
recessions, is structural or not.  
The traditional interpretation the Beveridge curve is being challenged also by other 
economists: for example, Klinger and Weber
13
 question the common view that shifts of 
the Beveridge curve occur for structural reasons, whereas movements along the curve 
are cyclical: on the basis of a matching function, integrated with an unobserved 
components framework, both the key variables – unemployment and vacancies – and 
the shifting parameters – matching efficiency, separation rate and employment – are 
disentangled into a permanent and a transitory component. The first reflects structural 
changes, while the latter represents the trend deviation. Thus, every variable composing 
the Beveridge curve, and therefore influencing the labour market, can have either a 
permanent or a temporary effect on the curve, shifting it or changing the position on the 
curve. 
Lubik and Rhodes
14
, instead, use a model, developed by Lubik and Benati (2013), that 
takes into account real GDP and technological change, besides the two traditional 
variables, to explain the observed deviation from the common negative correlation. The 
authors assume that two kinds of shocks can occur: the first is a typical cyclical shock 
and determines that the unemployment rate and the job – vacancy rate move in opposite 
directions, following the common negative relationship; the second type of shock is due 
to technological change and determines a skill mismatch: job vacancies increase as well 
as the unemployment rate, causing the curve to shift outwards. 
                                                         
12
 Diamond, Sahin (2014). 
13
 Klinger, Weber (2014). 
14
 Lubik, Rhodes (2014). 
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Ball
15
 tries to explain why also inflation sometimes increases along with 
unemployment, whereas, according to the Phillips curve
16
, the two phenomena should 
follow opposite paths. Ball explicitly imputes this fact to hysteresis, defined as the 
possibility that, after long periods of high unemployment, the NAIRU
17
 itself increases. 
Ball thus argues that NAIRU changes depend not only on supply-side variables, such as 
labour market imperfections or shocks, but also on aggregate demand. In particular, the 
author highlights the insider-outsider wage bargaining process and the possibility that 
long-term unemployed may become detached from the labour market. Diamond and 
Sahin
18
 do not mention explicitly the concept of hysteresis, but highlight that a shift in 
the Beveridge curve may be considered a signal of structural changes in the labour 
market only if the unemployment rate does not reach its pre – recession level during the 
recovery period. 
Strongly related to the Beveridge curve is the concept of efficiency, crucial in the so-
called search theory
19
: the level of efficiency is low when the encounter between supply 
and demand for labour is difficult or imperfect. Elements that make the labour market 
less efficient could be, for example, a heavy EPL or a high tax wedge on labour. Also, 
during recessions, unemployment tends to increase, given its pro-cyclical 16ehavior, 
which follows quite exactly that of the business cycle. 
The standard Mortensen and Pissarides matching model
20
 is characterized by a 
continuum of risk neutral consumer-workers, whose total mass is equal to 1, and by a 
continuum of potential firms, having infinite mass, and whose only input for production 
is labour. Each firm consists of one worker, who provides time spent working equal to 
one, while the time is equal to zero when the worker is unemployed. To hire a worker, a 
firm must open a vacancy that incurs a cost cυ per period. Worker-firm pairs can be 
destroyed either exogenously with constant probability ρεχ or endogenously. 
                                                         
15
 Ball (2009). 
16
 The curve describes the inverse relationship existing between unemployment and inflation. The long-
period curve, obtained by shifting successive short-period Phillips curves, indicates the non accelerating 
inflation rate of unemployment, which is generally considered the natural rate of unemployment.  
17
 Non-Accelerating Inflation Rate of Unemployment. The concept appeared in the 1950s together with 
the Phillips curve. 
18
 Diamond, Sahin  (2014). 
19
 D. Mortensen, P. Pissarides and P.Diamond won the Nobel prize for Economics in 2010 for their search 
theory. 
20 
Fujita (2003). 
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Unemployed workers and firms with open vacancies engage in the search activity in a 
matching market, characterized by a constant return-to-scale aggregate matching 
function: mt =m(υt , νt), where mt denotes the number of matches formed in the period t, 
υt denotes unemployment and νt denotes job vacancies. 
When a shock occurs in the economy, vacancies respond immediately: the negative 
shock lowers the expected returns for the firm with constant posting cost cυ, thus 
vacancies drop, eventually raising the matching probability, until the equilibrium is 
restored. Vacancies also move back to the pre-shock level, since, as unemployment 
rises, the matching probability for firms grows, eliminating the firms’ incentive to cut 
vacancies any further. 
Fujita
21
 recognizes the ability of the model in explaining important empirical 
regularities regarding job flows and employment, nevertheless underlines that the 
standard model is unable to generate realistic dynamics in vacancies and 
unemployment, i.e. a credible Beveridge Curve. Hence the author extends the 
benchmark model, adding three elements: (i) firms must engage in costly planning to 
introduce new jobs into the economy; vacancies are posted only after completing the 
planning stage; (ii) firms with currently operating jobs can decide to “mothball” them 
with no cost, temporarily destroying the jobs; the firms can then reactivate them, paying 
a retooling cost; retooled jobs can be immediately reposted; (iii) the new employment 
relationships that meet in period t-1 draw idiosyncratic productivity shocks at the 
beginning of the period t. 
Since the firms have an option to mothball their jobs, endogenous job separations do not 
completely destroy the jobs. Fujita finds it inappropriate to assume that idiosyncratic 
shocks induce permanent job destruction; instead this only happens due to obsolescence 
of technology.  
Thanks to these corrections, the model performs better in presenting dynamic 
correlations between unemployment and vacancies and in generating a realistic 
Beveridge Curve, while the standard benchmark model exhibits virtually no correlation. 
According to Fujita’s model the initial decline in vacancies is faster than the initial 
increase in unemployment, because firms can mothball preexisting jobs, hence 
responding quickly to aggregate shocks. 
                                                         
21
 Fujita (2003). 
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The importance of efficiency in the matching process is on the main rationales of many 
labour market reforms that were recently implemented in Europe: individually-tailored 
job interviews and counseling, training programmes and a better management of 
vacancies posting are crucial to improve the efficiency of both public and private 
placement offices. 
 
1.5. The Okun’s law 
The Okun’s law22 is a rule of thumb that relates changes in the rate of unemployment to 
changes in the rate of GDP growth. Traditionally, the law assigns a decrease of 2 – 3% 
decrease in GDP growth to a 1% increase in the unemployment rate. 
Okun posited two versions of his law: the first is called the difference version and 
highlights the contemporaneous correlation between output growth and unemployment 
movements. The relationship between the natural log of observed real output (    an the 
observed unemployment rate (  ) is given by:                          
    where   is the intercept,         is Okun’s coefficient, which measures how much 
unemployment changes when output changes, and   is the disturbance term. 
The second version, called the gap version, highlights the connection that links the level 
of unemployment to the gap between potential output and actual output. The 
specification is given by the following expression:       
              
       
where y* represents the log of potential output and u* is the natural rate of  
unemployment. This second version of the law is influenced by the measure of the 
potential output, since there are no observable data on y* and u*: different either 
univariate or multivariate statistical approaches can be used (e.g. the deterministic trend, 
the Hodrick – Prescott filter, quadratic trend, Baxter – King filter…) and this changes 
the estimations because of uncertainty about parameters and data. 
                                                         
22
 The law was posited by Arthur Okun, after whom it is named, in 1962. It is an empirically observed, 
rather than theory – derived, relationship between unemployment and losses in a country’s output. This 
relationship rests on Okun’s belief that potential output should be defined as the maximum output that an 
economy could produce when at full employment. Okun regressed changes in the unemployment rate on 
changes in the log of real GNP:       
            
 , where    is the unemployment rate,   is the 
natural log of output measured with real GNP. Based on data referring to USA FROM 1947:q2 to 
1960:Q4, Okun derived that        and         ; therefore a 1% increase in unemployment would 
be associated with a 3% decrease in the real output growth.  
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Over time, this law has been criticized as it lacks theoretical foundation and because, 
depending on the dataset, the period used for the estimation, and the estimation method, 
the estimate changes. On the other hand, some studies posited the hypothesis that there 
may be structural breaks in the relationship between unemployment and output growth, 
specifically related to business cycles. Owyang and Sekhposyan
23
 conducted a 
regression – based analysis to verify time variations in the relationship between 
unemployment and output growth. In particular, the authors aimed at determining 
whether Okun’s law changes permanently during recessions. First of all, the authors 
state, citing Okun himself, that potential output is the maximum the economy can 
produce in conditions of full employment. Such an assumption implies that each 
deviation of output from its trend is correlated to a deviation from NAIRU and 
viceversa.  
Through a regression – based model24, then, the authors estimate the correlation 
between changes in the unemployment rate and output growth using data referring to 
the USA in a sample period including 1949: Q1 – 2011: Q4. The authors detect 
significant variations over business cycles: in particular, the correlation decreased 
significantly between 1965 and 1975, while it increased significantly during the 1990s 
and then during the Great Recession. There seems to be strong evidence that the Great 
Recession intensified the unemployment rate – output growth relationship compared 
with an average historic recession. 
Owyang and Sekhposyan’s conclusion is that when the average unemployment rate 
fluctuations are high, the unemployment rate is also more sensitive to output growth 
variations; moreover all recessions seem to alter the unemployment fluctuations. Such 
alterations persist also after recoveries, indicating that recessions create hysteresis 
effects on the unemployment rate and on its elasticity to output growth variations.  
Cazes, Verick and Al Hussami
25
 found similar results in their study about the different 
labour market responses to the Great Recession across OECD countries and, in 
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particular, between the US and Europe, on the basis of their labour market institutions
26
. 
In fact, in the 1980s and 1990s, the United States had low unemployment and a very 
flexible labour market, whereas continental Europe was accused to experience 
hysteresis, high unemployment rates and low job creation effectiveness because of strict 
EPL, over – generous unemployment benefits and strong unionization. At the end of 
2010, however, the US had swapped places with Europe: the US’s labour market was 
deeply deteriorated by the crisis, while continental Europe
27
 showed a good level of 
resilience.  
To explain this divergent patterns, Cazes, Verick and Al Hussami used the Okun’s law 
as a framework, investigating the role of labour market institutions in explaining the 
different shifts in Okun’s coefficients both across the business cycle and across 
countries. Through the technique of rolling regression the usual linear equation 
describing the Okun’s law is estimated and the results show a considerable divergence 
during the Great Recession: coefficients change across countries and time, in the latter 
case following the business cycle. 
Turning to studies that consider the parameters to be substantially stable over the 
business cycle, Perman and Tavera
28
 take the Okun’s Law coefficient as the net effect 
of several macroeconomic structural parameters representative of the macroeconomic 
behavior of a country and check if some sub-groups of European countries are 
constitute an optimal zone, testing for convergence of the Okun’s Law coefficient. 
Different sets of groups are considered: (i) the first group includes all the EC countries; 
(ii) the second set of grouping is based on the level of GNP – high, intermediate and 
low GNP; (iii) the third is based on geographical considerations – northern, southern 
and western countries; (iv) the last set of groups in constructed on the basis of the 
Bayoumi – Eichengreen classification of European countries according to the degree of 
correlation of demand and supply shocks across countries – it distinguishes between 
core and periphery countries. The rolling regression estimates suggest that short – run 
OLC of European countries follow parallel paths, but there is no evidence that such a 
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convergence holds for the medium – or the long – term. If the group of Occidental 
countries (Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg and Netherlands) is 
considered, convergence of both the short – run and the medium – run OLC is found. 
The authors’ conclusion about these findings is that there may be an underlying 
common trend for output gaps movements on unemployment gaps in Europe, whose 
time evolution is influenced by country – specific disturbances, e.g. labour market 
rigidities, technology adoption rates, market structure..). In the authors’ opinion, this is 
the reason for the diverging resulting unemployment rates movements as a consequence 
of a common shock. The results of this study will be reprised in Chapter 4, to verify the 
different levels of resilience of European countries after the Great Recession. 
 
1.6. The international differences in labour market institutions 
The flexicurity model vs the transitional market model 
Debates in Europe about the organization of labour markets are converging towards two 
models
29
: the flexicurity model and the transitional market model. As Van Vliet et al.
30
 
described “flexicurity refers to a combination of loose employment protection (EPL), 
generous unemployment benefits and strong efforts on active labour market policies 
(ALMPs). The transitional labour market model offers a broad view
31
 of possible 
transitions that individuals may make during their life course”. The two models differ in 
the combination of duration and generosity of unemployment benefits, strictness of EPL 
and efforts, conditionality and spending on ALMPs, reviewed in this paragraph.  
Van Vliet and colleagues focused their attention on the generosity of unemployment 
benefits in flexicurity models across Europe, taking as independent variables 
influencing the benefits partisan politics, industrial relations and ALMPs. They found 
that partisan policies have a smaller role than expected at high unemployment rates and 
when the budgetary situation is deteriorating, even though left-wing parties are more 
prone to increase benefits, while right-wing parties tend to cut them. 
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Concerning industrial relations, coordinated and centralized bargaining has a positive 
impact on benefit generosity, especially in times of high unemployment, when unions 
tend to safeguard unemployment protection, possibly in exchange for wage moderation. 
The authors basically confirm the idea that, in the flexicurity model, more flexibility in 
the labour market is compensated with more generous unemployment benefits, an idea 
that is criticized by several economists and politicians across Europe. 
For example, Barbieri and Cutuli
32
 observe that flexibility created a highly segmented 
labour market, in which is very difficult to get a stable job. The reason, in the authors’ 
opinion, is that the deregulation occurred mainly for the fixed-term contracts, which are 
thus less protected. The authors observe two effects of the deregulation: a “honeymoon” 
effect, i.e. a transitory positive effect on employment, and a substitution effect of 
undetermined-term contracts with unprotected fixed-term contracts. The situation is 
particularly severe for Southern European countries, whereas the Scandinavian and in 
general Northern European labour markets were already less regulated and therefore 
experienced smaller segmentation effects. 
The alternative model debated by economists is that of transitional labour markets. 
Schmid
33
 argues that the traditional macroeconomic notion of full employment is no 
longer sustainable because of various trends, such as globalization, information 
technology diffusion and individualization. A new full employment paradigm has to be 
developed, mainly through a working time reduction and redistribution. The author, 
then, introduces the concepts of transitional employment and of transitional 
unemployment: setting the standard working time at, say, 30 hours per week, any 
deviation from this standard is a phase of transitional employment. Unemployment thus 
becomes an extreme of such a phase, and it can be made transitional as well through 
forms of transitional employment, e.g. short-time work, temporary part-time work, 
training or career leaves. 
Schmid individuates eight “critical events” in the labour market: (i) job loss – transition 
to unemployment; (ii) school-to-work transition; (iii) transition from one employer to 
another; (iv) transition from one skilled job to another; (v) transition from dependent to 
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self-employment; (vi) transition from full-time to short-/part-time work; (vii) transition 
from unpaid family work to gainful employment; (viii) transition to retirement
34
. 
To deal with these critical events, transitional labour markets use a set of institutions 
and active labour market policies, which satisfy four basic criteria: empowerment – 
individuals not only receive a benefit for income protection, but are also put in the 
condition to cope with critical events; sustainable employment and income – individuals 
are supported and “activated” in a framework of effective employment promotion; 
flexible coordination between individuals and local agencies; cooperation between 
private and public agencies to create synergies. 
Such a labour market model is viewed also as a remedy for the current dual working 
time regime, in which some people work regularly overtime and others (mainly women) 
involuntarily have part-time jobs, but would be available for longer working hours. 
 
 
2. What lessons – if any – can be learnt from international 
comparisons? 
2.1. Econometric analysis in the literature 
As clarified in the introduction, the aim of the present work is to evaluate and compare 
the labour market reforms implemented in the major European countries, to retrieve 
similarities and recognize differences. But what lessons – if any – can be learnt from 
cross – country analysis? 
To date, there is no consensus about how “optimal” labour market institutions should 
be, as labour market functioning is influenced not only by its own structure, but also by 
a number of other elements, e.g. product market regulations, public finances situation, 
employment culture and so on. Each country, therefore, follows a different path and has 
different needs and results. Thus, it does not seem that an optimal labour market 
institution framework can exist for all countries. 
Moreover, methods like the Beveridge curve or the matching model might result in 
unreliable forecasts, as they only take into account a number of variables, while the 
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performances of a labour market are determined by many others, not considered in 
models, or whose magnitude cannot be foreseen by models. 
Nevertheless, many economists have studied the functioning of labour markets, 
considering different context and using different methodologies, in order to find 
regularities and draw general conclusions. 
 
Different outcomes in labour markets 
From a theoretic point of view, Scarpetta
35
 uses a model of equilibrium
36
 in the labour 
market to analyse the differences in the unemployment rate across countries and to 
evaluate the impact of policy variables and labour market institutions affect the level of 
structural unemployment and the speed of labour market adjustment to shocks. 
Scarpetta assumes that a number of variables explain the differences in the 
unemployment rate across countries; in particular, the author identifies the following: (i) 
cyclical factors – at any point in time countries may have different positions in the 
business cycle and this affects the size and dynamics of the cyclical component of 
unemployment; to account for these factors the measure of the output gap is used; (ii) 
policy variables – in particular active labour market policies (proxied by expenditure on 
ALMP per unemployed person relative to output per capita), unemployment benefits 
(measured as the average of net replacement rates for individuals with different spell 
durations), employment protection legislation (proxied by the average of the two OECD 
indexes measuring the strictness of EPL rules for regular and fixed – term contracts) and 
the tax wedge (average tax rates for average production workers); (iii) institutional 
factors – union density, the wage bargaining process and exposure to trade; (iv) other 
factors – real interest rates and terms of trade.  
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The results of the regression analysis show that high levels of unemployment benefits 
and stringent employment protection legislation are associated with high rates of 
structural unemployment and non – employment; worker bargaining power may lead to 
high unemployment, unless it is accompanied by a well – coordinated bargaining 
process; the analysis by Scarpetta also shows that the estimated impact of active labour 
market policies and of tax wedge are small and statistically not very significant. 
Scarpetta explains differences across different countries’ structural unemployment rates 
through the joint impact of wage bargaining institutions and of employment protection 
legislation and through the generosity of the unemployment benefits, confirming that 
ALMP only explain a small proportion of unemployment differentials. 
 
Active labour market policies 
Escudero
37
, instead, analyzed the direct and indirect effects of active labour market 
policies. The author uses an aggregate impact approach based on a pooled cross – 
country and time – series database and a panel data model38. The analysis shows that 
ALMP have a significant negative impact on the unemployment rate, proving 
particularly effective in reducing the rate of unemployment of low – skilled population. 
The author also verifies the effects of job rotation and job sharing, finding a negative 
but non – significant effect on unemployment. Implementation, instead, resulted 
important: raising the share of PES in total ALMP expenditure proved to be effective in 
reducing unemployment, although not very significantly for the low – skilled 
population. Finally, timing seems to be an important determinant of the effectiveness of 
ALMPs: countercyclical policies have a more significant effect in reducing 
unemployment. Findings of the employment rate estimation are very similar to those of 
unemployment rate. Finally, Escudero finds significant positive effects of ALMPs on 
the participation rate. 
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Passive labour market policies 
Tatsiramos
39
, instead, analyses the effects of unemployment benefits. The literature 
highlights the disincentive effect of unemployment insurance systems, which  reduce 
significantly the hazard rate for leaving unemployment, especially when the system is 
very generous, e.g. in Germany and France. Tatsiramos, although recognizing this 
negative direct impact, also posits a positive effect of unemployment benefits: they can 
be interpreted as search subsidies, therefore increasing reservation wages and the 
subsequent quality of job matching. Thus, the author uses a multivariate mixed 
proportional hazard model to estimate the effect of unemployment benefits, using data 
from the European Community Household Panel (ECHP) for eight European countries. 
The author found that receiving benefits has a significant increasing effect on 
unemployment in all countries, especially if the system is very generous; moreover, 
older and/or low skilled workers are less likely to leave unemployment. On the other 
hand, though, benefit recipients are less likely to exit subsequent employment and this 
result is significant in all countries. Especially younger, married and well – educated 
workers have a higher employment stability. 
On the basis of these results, Tatsiramos suggests that, although no conclusions can be 
drawn about the optimal level of unemployment benefits, both the effect of longer 
unemployment spell and the effect of higher employment stability should be taken into 
account when designing this kind of policies. 
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Collective bargaining and wage setting 
Related to both active and passive employment policies, collective bargaining has the 
aim of addressing and rebalancing the asymmetry between individual workers and 
employers regarding access to information and bargaining power. Literature 
traditionally considers the level at which bargaining is carried out as the most important 
element for the outcome of the process; in particular, centralized or coordinated 
bargaining is associated with the internalization of the externalities caused by wage 
increases and with better effects on unemployment. Firm – level bargaining allows for 
innovation, for better adjustments to specific productivity levels and for internal 
flexibility. The least effective models of collective bargaining seem to be the sector or 
regional level and cross – sector imitation, as these levels usually delay adjustments to 
productivity changes and create an excessive upwards pressure on wages
40
. 
Visser
41
 investigates different aspects of collective bargaining institutions to figure out 
how they are evolving in OECD countries, bearing in mind that no consensus has been 
reached about which model works best. The first dimension taken into account by the 
author is bargaining coverage, i.e. “the proportion of employees or wage earners to 
whom a collective agreement signed by a union or worker representative and the 
employers or employers’ association applies”42. The rate of bargaining coverage 
describes the degree of collective organization much better than the unionization rate 
and the data about the two rarely coincide. In fact, many European countries show low 
(and diminishing) rates of unionization but high coverage rates, demonstrating how the 
wage effects of collective bargaining often exceed union membership, also because, in 
many cases, employers are required by law to apply collective agreements to all 
employees, including the non – union members. 
The second dimension investigated by Visser is the degree of centralization. In recent 
times, several countries converged towards decentralization, defined like the 
“downward movement of placing the locus of decision making over wages and working 
hours closer to the individual enterprise”. The author argues that the reasons for this 
trend are: (i) the diminishing ability of multi – employer agreements to prevent low – 
wage competition; (ii) the changes in organization and management functions in firms, 
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which create a mismatch between sector agreements and firms’ activities; (iii) the 
increased volatility of global markets, which create a need for quick adjustments 
regarding the number of employees, the amount of working hours or wages, which are 
easier to reach at firm level. 
Decentralization is evaluated by the author through three elements: the dominant 
bargaining level, the articulation of levels and the use of opening clauses. In general, 
Visser states that, in Europe, central/national or sector/industry bargaining is the most 
common for SMEs, while derogations and opening clauses often exist for larger firms
43
. 
The articulation of levels is an important issue for organization and governability of 
multi – employer and multi – level systems of bargaining and it relates to the 
interdependence relations between the different levels. The author argues that a stable 
and efficient nesting of company bargaining within sector or central agreements rests on 
the existence of a strong and competent union – based workplace representation and of a 
peace clause established by the higher – level agreement, which binds to refrain from 
strikes.  
Finally, concerning the effect of minimum wages, literature traditionally states that 
excessively high minimum wages have a negative effect on employment; this result is 
confirmed by empirical observation, which shows also that moderate to low minimum 
wages have a negligible or even positive effect. In fact, Brown, Merkl and Snower
44
 
provided new theoretical explanations for these facts through a dynamic incentive 
model that contains a two – sided selection in the labour market: both the demand and 
the supply side of the market are taken into account; after the first contact between 
workers and firms, idiosyncratic shocks arise – i.e. firms learn about different suitability 
of workers and workers learn about the disagreeability of work. Given these shocks and 
the minimum wage, firms make their job offers and workers their job acceptance 
decisions
45
. From the numerical analysis the authors conclude that, although large 
wages tend to depress firms’ job offers, they raise workers’ acceptance rates: therefore, 
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the negative effects of a moderate minimum wages could be offset by the job 
acceptance effect.  
Gorry
46
 investigated, in particular, the relationship between minimum wages and youth 
unemployment. The author expanded the Mortensen – Pissarides search model, 
including two types of worker on the basis of experience. In particular, experienced 
workers are different from inexperienced workers on four dimensions: (i) experienced 
workers have a fixed productivity level, while inexperienced ones have match specific 
productivity draws from a known, fixed distribution; (ii) inexperienced workers face 
idiosyncratic match productivity shocks that influence their separation rates; (iii) 
experienced and inexperienced workers face different potential separation probabilities; 
(iv) workers search for jobs in separate markets with different flow costs of posting 
vacancies and match rates. The parameterization, made to match key features of the 
labour market in the United States shows that the model is consistent with empirical 
data: as minimum wages rise, unemployment increases among young workers become 
more dramatic; moreover, the exposure to high minimum wages at young ages has long-
run effects: human capital accumulation is lower and results in lower wages for older 
workers who did not gain enough experience. 
 
The different European social models 
One of the results of applying these analysis to the empirical reality is the taxonomy “of 
social Europe”, a series of clusters of European countries that are quite homogeneous 
from the point of view of labour market institutions. In particular, the clusters 
highlighted are the following: (i) Scandinavian countries – characterized by extensive 
interventions in the labour market, especially through active policies, substantial tax 
wedges and employment protection in the form of insurance systems against the risk of 
unemployment; (ii) Anglo – Saxon countries – characterized by weak unions and 
decentralized bargaining that allow for wage dispersion and by active labour market 
policy schemes conditioning the access to benefits; (iii) Continental countries – which 
rely essentially on unemployment benefits combined with relatively stringent 
employment protection legislation; (iv) Mediterranean countries – characterized by 
high levels of employment protection and low unemployment benefits, centralized 
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collective bargaining systems and substantial underdeveloped active labour market 
policies and employment services. 
Actually, also this kind of distinction is losing part of its significance, as Boeri
47
 
noticed, because, while labour market institutions have been subject to frequent policy 
changes in the last 25 years, the clusters have been converging one towards another, 
while countries of the same cluster have been implementing different reform solutions. 
 
2.2. Methodology  
In the present work, I argue that there are no optimal labour market institutions, policies 
or reform paths; rather there are many elements that concur to the labour market 
performance  and different settings of institutions and policies that may prove effective 
for different countries. 
In the following chapter, thus, I try to compare the reforms and to analyse them within a 
common framework. In particular, the reforms are categorized in one of the following 
groups of measures: (i) employment protection legislation; (ii) unemployment benefits; 
(iii) active labour market policies; (iv) wage setting institutions. The goal of such a 
categorization is to show that, although the measures can be reconciled in quasi – 
homogeneous groups, there is no such concept as an optimal setting or combination of 
labour market policies. This result is justified by the different employment and 
unemployment rates and by the different labour market performances of the countries 
reviewed in this work.  
In Chapter 3 the impact of the Great Recession is introduced to complete the analysis of 
the different labour market performances. In particular, I tried to highlight the 
interdependence between the structure of national economies, labour market institutions 
and economic shocks in shaping the outcomes of countries in the recent downturn. 
In the second part, after introducing the European Union’s general framework, I review 
the main reforms implemented in selected European countries since 1990. 
I chose to select the biggest European countries – i.e. France, Germany, Italy, Spain and 
the United Kingdom – to draw a general framework of the main labour market reforms 
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implemented in Europe in the last 25 years. To have such a view, an accurate historical 
narrative is essential; in fact, the different outcomes of labour market institutions and 
the more recent trends are the result of the different paths followed by the governments. 
The selected countries account almost for the 63% of the total population of the 
European Union and for more than the 64% of the labour force; thus, I find that they can 
be somehow representative of the main European approaches to labour market failures 
and challenges. 
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Chapter 2: Comparative analysis of the major reforms and labour 
market institutions in Europe 
1. Drivers of labour market regulation reforms 
According to literature, there are a number of determinants which stimulate the 
implementation of labour market reforms. The first driver on which literature has 
traditionally focused is the timing over the business cycle: the hypothesis is that when 
economic conditions are deteriorating, the need for reforms is perceived as more 
stringent, increasing the political feasibility of changes. For example, in the 1980s, the 
Thatcher government implemented several reforms of the labour market to cure the so – 
called “British disease”: despite a modest rate of unemployment, the productivity and 
output growth rates were quite low, while labour costs and inflation were raising fast. 
The recent downturn as well induced several countries to undertake reforms to contrast 
job losses and slower output growth. 
Adascalitei and Pignatti Morano
48
 constructed a measure of reform intensity
49
 that can 
be applied to both developed and developing countries, making the data about 
reforming process more comparable across countries. The results of the authors’ 
analysis show that the statistically significant drivers for reforms are: (i) unemployment 
levels; (ii) low GDP growth rates – for developed countries50; (iii) government net debt 
– countries with limited fiscal space implement labour market reforms as a budget 
neutral tool to improve the performance of labour markets. 
While macroeconomic conditions may be bad, the budget balance of a country wanting 
to implement structural reforms ought to be sound. In fact, reforms, especially deep and 
structural ones, usually have both winners and losers; the latter have to be compensated 
by governments. Hence, the public finances must be solid enough to allow for these 
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compensations. Other authors have found also other reasons for the importance of a 
sound fiscal position: Eichengreen and Wyplosz
51
 highlight that poor finances may 
force governments to turn to unpopular fiscal adjustment measures, leaving them with 
less political ability to undertake a structural reform; Duval
52
 argues that a strong initial 
fiscal position allows to have more room for fiscal policy to stimulate aggregate 
demand. 
Also existing levels of regulation may be important for the decision of reforming either 
the product or the labour market: stringent regulations are likely to call for structural 
reforms, usually towards relaxation. Moreover, when a country opens to foreign 
competition, structural reforms are often observed, usually with the aim of aligning the 
country’s legislation to that of competitors. 
Finally, evidence suggests that implementing structural reforms in one policy area 
stimulates the policy interconnections across other areas, fostering reforms in other 
domains, like product market and finance. 
The findings of literature seem to be justified in Europe by the empirical observation of 
policy interventions during the Great Recession: the number of reforms between 2008 
and 2014 has increased in the European Union, following an increase in the rate of 
unemployment and by a slow GDP growth rate. Moreover, as we observed in Chapter 2, 
inequality increased in the labour markets of virtually all European countries, becoming 
another challenge to face for governments through labour market policy tools. 
Contrary to what literature would predict, trade openness has been found to be not 
statistically associated with the probability of implementing reforms in Adascalitei and 
Pignatti Morano’s study. 
Finally, Adascalitei and Pignatti Morano found that the impact of institutional and 
macroeconomic variables change depending on the labour market subdomain: the 
business cycle, for instance, stimulates reforms regarding collective dismissals and 
working hours, while the unemployment rate predicts reforms regarding permanent 
contracts, collective bargaining and dismissals, while it is not significant for the 
legislation of temporary contracts and other forms of employment. 
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Duval conducted a similar work to that of Adascalitei and Pignatti Morano, largely 
confirming their hypothesis, and adding that also the commitment to a fixed exchange 
rate regime may make governments more prone to structural reforms, as cuts to the 
interest rates and the depreciation of exchange rate is prevented. 
 
2. Comparing the reforms in Europe 
To compare the reforms, the following categories
53
 will be used: (i) employment 
protection legislation; (ii) unemployment benefits; (iii) active labour markets policies; 
(iv) wage setting. Moreover, the different versions of the single/unified contract 
proposed across Europe will be discussed.  
 
Employment protection legislation 
Employment legislation is significant for labour markets’ outcomes, as theoretical and 
empirical research suggests that hiring and firing regulations have an impact on the 
allocation of labour resources; in particular, high employment protection levels seem to 
be associated with lower hiring rate, lower separation rates and slower resilience to 
shocks
54
. 
To benchmark international differences in the stringency of employment protection, 
OECD elaborated indicators that quantify the costs and procedures involved in 
dismissing either individuals or groups or hiring workers on fixed – term or agency 
contracts, as in force on the 1
st
 January of each year.  
The indicators concerning dismissals of regular workers cover the following elements: 
(i) procedural inconveniences that employers face when starting the dismissal process, 
e.g. notification or consultation requirements; (ii) notice periods and severance pay; (iii) 
difficulty of dismissal, i.e. the circumstances in which dismissal of workers is 
considered fair and the consequences of unfair dismissal, i.e. compensation and 
reinstatement; (iv) additional restrictions to dismissal, e.g. additional costs, delays, 
notifications or procedures, for example on collective redundancies. 
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Looking at the EPL indexes and at the reforms of the countries reviewed in Chapter 2, 
various approaches can be detected, although the duality between regular and temporary 
contracts is a common issue in all countries.  
Germany has not eased its employment protection, which remained at a medium level 
(2.87 for regular contracts and 1.12 for temporary contracts in 2013). Another country 
that did not reform its EPL is the United Kingdom: the index is traditionally low for 
both regular and temporary contracts (respectively around 1.19 and 0.3 since the 
beginning of 2000s); thus, the British labour market was already quite flexible.  
Other countries, instead, maintained a high level of EPL for regular contracts, 
introducing flexibility at the margin. France, for instance, introduced the CIP (contrat 
d’insertion professionelle) in 1994 and the CPE (contrat de première embauche) in 
2006 for the young (both repealed) and various forms of CDD (contrat à durée 
indeterminée) over the period considered, and changed various times the scope of the 
contribution Delalande, but never really reformed EPL for regular contracts (CDI – 
contrat à durée indeterminée). It must be noted, however, that French legislation is very 
precise and strict about the cases in which CDDs can be used and about their duration. 
Therefore, France’s EPL strictness indexes for regular and temporary contracts were 
respectively 2.34 and 3.6.  
Spain was the first country to introduce temporary contracts in 1984 and also the 
country where this form of employment was more used; for these reasons, over the 
period considered, Spanish EPL reforms had the aim of reducing the share of STJ. First 
of all, restrictions to the use of temporary contracts were introduced, then severance 
pays were reformed several times, in order to make firing costs of STJ and LTJ more 
similar and incentive the use of permanent contracts. Nevertheless, the EPL strictness 
index is still very high: for regular contracts decreased slightly, although remaining over 
2 in 2013, while it decreased more decidedly for temporary contracts, though remaining 
over 2.5. 
In Italy EPL was very high at the beginning of the period considered in the present 
work; over time it has been slightly reduced, although remaining very high. The main 
reforms prior to Jobs Act mainly introduced flexible forms of contract, without 
substantially touching the protection level of insiders. In 2013, the EPL index was 2.89 
for regular contracts and 2.7 for temporary contracts. Only in 2014, with the 
introduction of the so called contratto a tutele crescenti, the issue of the segmented 
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Italian labour market: a single open – ended contract was introduced, with new layoff 
procedures; the general idea is that easier firing will encourage firms to hire more. 
However, it is still too early for updated EPL indexes and to draw conclusions about the 
results of the reform. 
 
Unemployment benefits 
Unemployment benefits are a key  instrument to support income an provide assistance 
to the unemployed and to smooth aggregate shocks, but, if not properly designed, they 
may have important adverse effects, e.g. sub – optimal job search intensity, 
unemployment and inactivity traps or benefit dependence. 
To assess reform needs in this policy area, Stovicek and Turrini
55
 propose a 
methodology that considers the effectiveness in ensuring income support, the effects on 
the incentive to take up jobs and the generosity of the benefit system
56
. The results of 
this benchmarking process show homogeneity within country groups (Nordic, 
Continental, Anglo – Saxon, Southern and Central/Eastern countries) and with respect 
to the EU average, although the combination of the dimensions may show greater 
variability; the overall generosity, instead, varies widely across Europe and shows a 
remarkable stability over time. 
Concerning the reforms, the first country to reorganize its unemployment benefit system 
was the United Kingdom: in the 1980s the Thatcher government tightened the eligibility 
criteria and the value of transfers, while making interviews with the Employment 
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 Regarding the effectiveness in ensuring income support, the authors consider entitlement conditions; 
assessing the effects on the incentive to take up jobs, they consider unemployment and inactivity traps, 
duration of the provision of benefits, the time profile of benefits and job search and work availability; to 
compare systems across Europe, the EU average and the average within relevant country groupings 
(Nordic, Continental, Anglo – Saxon, Southern and Central/Eastern); finally, to assess the generosity the 
following formula is used:                       
 
                                   , 
where     stands for the net replacement rates, UI and UA respectively for unemployment insurance and 
unemployment assistance and the index   represents the different replacement levels over the spell. 
Generosity is assessed taking into accout also the real GDP per capita, the unemployment rate, the long – 
term unemployment rate, the government budget balance and the expenditure on activation policies. 
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Service a condition to receive benefits. The same approach was maintained by the Blair 
government, introducing the New Deal for the Young Unemployed.  
The German Hartz reforms reorganized the whole unemployment benefit and the social 
assistant system: a 12 – month unemployment benefit (Arbeitslosengeld I, ALG I) is 
provided to jobseekers on the basis of the former earning; after the expiry of the ALG I, 
jobseekers receive a flat – rate benefit (Arbeitslosengeld II, ALG II) that replaced the 
social assistance benefit.  
Pooling benefits in a single transfer to avoid errors and frauds and to make the system 
simpler for recipients was a measure taken also in France and in Great Britain; in 2009 
France merged two benefits into the Revenu de solidarité active, a single means – tested 
benefit for the unemployed; it has the aim of making work more profitable than staying 
on welfare, through a higher and gradual exit point from RSA and the so – called droits 
connexes. In Great Britain, in 2012, all the main means – tested benefits were pooled in 
one single transfer, the Universal Credit, to simplify and rationalize the benefit system. 
It was a common measure among the reviewed countries to tie benefit receipt with 
activation initiatives and stricter eligibility conditions; this way pf designing UI and 
ALMP as the two facets of the same coin allows to reduce the disincentive effects of 
welfare and to avoid dependence and skill loss. 
 
Active labour market policies 
As noted above, activation policies are an important instrument to balance the potential 
adverse effects of unemployment benefit systems. However, ALMPs have also other 
aims: they reduce imbalances and rigidities, facilitate the matching process and maintain 
the level of effective labour supply by keeping the outsiders attached to the labour 
market. The positive effects of ALMPs have already been highlighted in Chapter 1; 
Escudero
57
, using a panel data model based on an aggregate impact approach, finds that 
training, employment incentives, supported employment and rehabilitation and direct 
job creation are actually effective in improving the outcomes of the labour market, with 
a particular positive effect for the low skilled. In particular, the author highlights a 
decrease in unemployment and an increase in labour force participation. 
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Activation policies may have adverse effects as well; the main risks are: (i) 
displacement of other categories of workers and substitution effects; (ii) reduction in 
search efforts; (iii) in – work poverty; (iv) dead weight effects. 
In addition to being one of the first countries to tighten the eligibility for unemployment 
benfits, the United Kingdom was also one of the first to make interviews with the 
Employment Service compulsory for benefit recipients, with the Restart Programme in 
1986. The scope of British ALMPs was increased by the Labour party with the New 
Deal, through which the young unemployed get an intensive assistance in job search 
and then enter in subsidised work programmes. A measure taken by several countries 
was that of making job centres one – stop customer centres that bundle all labour – 
related services: in Great Britain they’re called Job Centres Plus, in Germany Job 
Centres, in France Pôle Emploi.  
In Italy, instead, the Biagi reform introduced a network of employment services, Borsa 
nazionale del lavoro, which links several different kinds of public and private bodies. 
The Jobs Act introduced a new agency for ALMP, Agenzia nazionale per le politiche 
attive del lavoro, although it is not operative yet. The Jobs Act also introduced a re – 
employment contract, through which jobseekers can get both the income support and 
the assistance to find a new job, and a regional voucher that jobseekers can spend in 
private employment agencies. 
Germany also introduced particular forms of contracts, characterized by the easing of 
the tax wedge on low – wage earners, the so – called Mini- and Midi – Jobs.  
Finally, some countries also introduced grants, loans and subsidies to encourage self – 
employment: for example Ich AG in Germany, the Enterprise Allowance Scheme in 
Great Britain, and Garanzia Giovani in Italy, besides a specific unemployment benefit 
for dependent self – employed workers. 
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Wage setting 
In his already mentioned study
58
, Visser states that European countries generally have a 
multi – employer and, in most cases, multi – level bargaining system. An important 
exception is represented by the United Kingdom, where, since 1980, the government 
has encouraged single – employer bargaining instead of sector bargaining. To date, in 
fact the 88% of agreements are signed at company/enterprise level. British workers’ 
bargaining coverage rate is quite low (31.2% in 2011) compared to other countries’ 
data. 
Regarding France, the bargaining system can be defined as “mixed”: 
company/enterprise agreements and industry/sector agreements account for 
approximately 40 – 50% each. In particular, sector bargaining regards mainly the SMIC 
and work conditions, while working hours are bargained at the enterprise level since the 
1990s. The coverage rate is quite high, 61% in 2011, despite the decline of unions; this 
is probably due to the duty, provided by the law, for employers to bargain with workers 
introduced in the 1970s with the Grenelle agreement, about mandatory recognition of 
union representatives in workplaces, and reinforced in 1982 with the Aurox laws, which 
obliged employers to bargain annually wages and work conditions with union 
representatives. 
Germany has, since before the unification, an industry/sector level bargaining system; 
only the 7 – 9% of agreements are signed at the single enterprise level. This system has 
resisted the disaffection process that affected both unions and employers’ association, 
once very powerful, in the post – unification period. It is important to note, however, 
that the coverage rate has declined in the past few years, though remaining high: it was 
76% in 1996 and diminished to 61% in 2011. 
Spain and Italy have, apparently, similar bargaining systems: both rely mostly on the 
sector level, with an enterprise/company level accounting for less than 15% in both 
countries. Despite the common result, the national paths have been very different over 
time. In fact, in Italy, union representation in larger firms, was made compulsory in 
1970 with the Statuto dei Lavoratori. Over the decades the industry level bargaining 
system was consolidated, although a few bi- or tri – partite social pacts were signed at 
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the central level. Since the 1990s, bargaining takes place both at the industry level, at 
which framework agreements are signed, an at the company level (for bigger firms). 
In Spain, instead, collective bargaining has been illegal until 1958 and free unions were 
made legal only in 1977. Traditionally, bargaining in Spain took place at the regional 
and at the sector level; in the post – Franco period, instead, a few experiments of 
centralization were made. The resulting system, though, was unarticulated, confused  
and characterized by a very low degree of governability. Thus, already during the 
1980s, the old regional and sector system was recovered. After the Great Recession, the 
levels of bargaining multiplied: in 2011 a bipartite incomes policy agreement was 
signed to provide a set of guidelines for industry/sector bargaining and in 2012 firms 
were given more opportunities to opt – out of agreements to regain competitivity. 
Concerning minimum wage, the findings by Brown, Merkl and Snower
59
 have already 
been reviewed; the authors provided a new two – sided explanation for some stylized 
facts: (i) Minimum wages that are low may have negligible or even positive 
employment effects; (ii) Minimum wages that are high have negative employment 
effects. Through a two – sided labour market flow model, which considers both the 
firms’ job demand and the workers’ job offer, the authors show that large wages depress 
firms’ job offers, but raise workers’ acceptance rates and that, under moderate wages, 
the latter effect may offset the former. Gorry
60
 confirms these empirical facts 
specifically for young workers.  
 
2.1. The proposal of a single contract  
Due to the diffusion of temporary contracts, labour markets in Europe have grown more 
and more dual: on one side there are highly protected open – ended contracts, while on 
the other we find under – protected deregulated fixed – term contracts and atypical jobs. 
Most of the reforms analysed in the present work have the aim of increasing the level of 
flexibility of labour markets, but were often implemented at the margin, thus increasing 
employment, but also the turnover rate.  
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To answer to this growing inequality in the labour market, several economists have 
proposed to introduce a single/unique contract; debates on the single contract have been 
particularly fruitful in France, Italy and Spain. The common characteristics of the 
national proposals are an open – ended contract by default and protection that increases 
with seniority.  
In France, Cahuc and Kramarz
61
 propose a single contract to stop the proliferation of 
atypical contracts, to ease the access to certain jobs and to improve the assistance to the 
unemployed. The authors argue that better active labour markets should be 
implemented, especially for the better skilled jobseekers, who can be placed relatively 
easily. Also the employment service should be reformed to make it more efficient and 
effective, pooling all the employment – related services, including training in a one – 
stop customer centre. Finally, Cahuc and Kramarz argue that the CDD should be 
suppressed and substituted with a single contract characterized by the possibility for 
employers to fire employees more easily, but in exchange for a tax. The authors 
argue that such a system would simplify the labour law and reduce inequalities. 
In Spain the share of temporary jobs had reached unprecedented levels already in 2006 
and was one of the most heavily hit countries during the Great Recession; dualism and 
inequality, thus, are extremely serious problems. Given this situation, 100 Spanish 
economists subscribed a manifesto proposing a single open – ended contract that would 
suppress the firing cost gap between temporary and permanent contracts. In particular, 
this contract should be open – ended by default, with legal protection for all workers 
and severance pay growing in time. In addition, a radical reform of the unemployment 
benefit system is proposed: each worker would be the holder of an “unemployment 
account” to which both the employer and the employee contribute. In case of 
unemployment, the worker would have an account to use, otherwise the account would 
accumulate and add to the worker’s pension at the end of his/her working life. 
Finally, in Italy Boeri and Garibaldi
62
 proposed three initiatives to fight precariousness 
and dualism in the Italian labour market: (i) a single contract; (ii) the national minimum 
wage; (iii) a unified system of social security contribution. The contract proposed by 
Boeri and Garibaldi is very similar to the French and Spanish ones and is open – ended 
by default; it is composed by two phases: the first phase is of entry and lasts up to three 
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years. During this first period the employee can be laid off in exchange of pecuniary 
compensation
63
. The second period, called fase di stabilità, is regulated by the current 
rules about layoffs.  
Indeed, the Italian Jobs Act has introduced a single contract, called contratto a tutele 
crescenti, applied to workers hired after March 2015. The contract has no ex – ante time 
limit and protection levels increase with the workers’ seniority. The two – phase system 
proposed by Boeri and Garibaldi was not implemented, nevertheless layoffs are 
resolved through a monetary indemnity as suggested by the authors. 
 Although single contracts are a very popular labour market institution to fight dualism 
in Europe these days, this does not mean that it is a panacea for all problems and that it 
cannot have side – effects. Barbieri and Fazio64 argue that the single contract entails the 
possibility of anticipated contracts: since the firing cost increases with seniority, the last 
hired are more at risk, as the cost of firing them is the lowest. In particular, in the 
transition period between the dual and the new single – contract system, the incidence 
of layoffs would still be concentrated in the new entrants, while there would still be a 
group of incumbent workers with a high employment protection. Precariousness, thus, 
would not be solved, but only anticipated in time. This could also disincentive the 
investments in human capital, which in turn would jeopardize the growth of labour 
productivity. 
 
3. Similarities and differences in the reforming paths  
Eichhorst and Konle – Seidl65 argue that differences in national labour market 
performances can be largely explained by the capacity of economic actors to adapt to 
structural shifts or business cycle variations, which in turn is influenced by labour 
market institutions like EPL, unemployment benefits and active policies. The authors 
also remind that complementarities between these institutions are important for the 
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effectiveness of reforms and policies, which, therefore, often address more than one 
area.  
Eichhorst and Konle – Seidl also argue that the interactions between labour institutions 
have different positive and negative effects on the interference with markets: strict EPL 
can stabilize employment and income, but, on the other side, reduce adaptability. It can 
also increase the duration of unemployment spells and hamper participation of weaker 
worker categories, i.e. older workers and women. Finally, introducing flexibility at the 
margin can create segmentation of the labour market, making transitions from flexible 
to stable jobs more difficult. With regard to unemployment benefits, too generous 
systems exert upward pression on wages and increase unemployment spells, creating 
disincentive to search a new job. On the other hand, benefits work as search subsidies 
and improve the matching process. To offset the negative effects of generous benefits, 
activation policies can be implemented: a combination between high reservation wages 
and stricter criteria, tests for eligibility, availability and compulsory participation in 
training programmes are the most common measures. Also ALMP can have adverse 
effects: in particular, lock – in effects that reduce search efforts, dead – weight and 
substitution effects that hamper the employment possibilities of non – participants.  
Finally, the authors single out some conditions that increase the capacity of a 
government to manage policy complementarities; first, the existence of veto points, like 
second chambers in federal systems, the necessity of social partners negotiations, or self 
– administration in social security, make governments weaker in implement policies 
that affect different policy areas. Second, if control of areas of economic policy is 
shared with social partners, complementarities can only be mobilized if there is 
coordination with employers’ associations and trade unions. In general, finally, reforms 
are more easily implemented when there is consensus on societal problems and 
objectives. 
On the basis of what said so far, two stages of the reforming process seem to be 
recognizable in Europe: some countries seem  to have completed the reforming process 
to create the flexicurity system – Germany and the United Kingdom – while others are 
still blocked at the “flexi” stage – in particular Italy and Spain, France being somewhere 
in-between. 
Germany and Great Britain have traditionally had less rigid employment protection 
legislation and, combining it with effective unemployment benefits implying back – to – 
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work active policies, have been able to mitigate the employment effects of the Great 
Recession. In these countries, the issue to be faced now seems to be more related to in – 
work poverty and to welfare dependence. 
Concerning Southern Europe, instead, Spain still faces a severely dual labour market, 
due to the excessive – sometimes improper – use of temporary contracts; the initiatives 
undertaken so far, e.g. subsidies for employers hiring workers with permanent contracts, 
do not seem to be sufficient. The suggested single contract could be a suitable solution, 
although it must be carefully designed and evaluated to avoid the transitional side 
effects mentioned above
66
.  
France and Italy have both seen the proliferation of forms of temporary and/or atypical 
contract, while in the field unemployment benefit and in the field of active labour 
market policies little was done, compared to countries like Germany. Italy introduced 
the long – debated single contract, but it is too early to evaluate its effects on the labour 
market and especially on precarious workers.  
Following Eichhorst’s67 analysis of internal flexibility, part – time contracts have 
proved more effective in granting flexibility than short – term ones, which seem to 
rather increase precariousness. 
The labour market reforming path in Europe is surely far from its ending and it must be 
combined with initiatives in different, though related, fields: education policies and 
employment policies must be designed in a complementary framework, so that school 
leavers find an easier way into the labour market and incumbent workers can undertake 
a life – long skill building journey; social security systems must be adapted to current 
demographic and fiscal conditions, in order to be sustainable and equal; wage 
bargaining processes should be both flexible and reliable, so that both 
underemployment and in – work poverty are avoided.   
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Chapter 3: European labour market institutions during the Great 
Recession 
1. The impact of the Great Recession on labour market institutions 
The recent crisis has been the deepest economic shock after the Great Depression in the 
1930s and it has had different impacts on different countries. These differences depend 
mainly on the structure of the economy – i.e. the relative weight of different sectors on 
the economy of a country, the state of the financial sector and of public finance, etc. – 
and on the labour market institutions of a certain country – e.g. employment protection 
legislation, unemployment benefits and active labour market policies. While the first 
element determines the degree of exposure of a country to economic shocks, the latter 
determines the ability of the labour market to absorb the shock and to cushion the 
negative effects on labour and the social impacts. 
Overall, the crisis has slowed down the employment growth, while job losses increased: 
the combination of labour market new entrants diminishing and of job losers increasing 
determined a rise in the unemployment rate in almost all countries, with the exception – 
in Europe – of Germany. In addition, the unemployment outflow rate has continuously 
decreased, highlighting an hysteresis effect, which suggests that the recovery will be 
slower compared to other downturns. 
In order to design the optimal response to the effects of the crisis, it is necessary to 
figure out whether the rise in unemployment is structural or cyclical. Though 
distinguishing cyclical and structural changes may be difficult, as it has already been 
discussed in Chapter 1, several studies argue that most of the large increase in 
unemployment during the 2007 – 2009 recession appears to be cyclic. Still, the intensity 
of the cyclical effect was by no means the same throughout Europe: significant cross-
country differences exist in the impact of the crisis in Europe, depending both on the 
structure of economy and on the labour market institutions; as already mentioned, the 
employment shares of vulnerable sectors greatly influenced the impact of the crisis. In 
particular, the sectors considered vulnerable are those of manufacturing and that of 
housing; countries that rely on one of these sectors – for example Spain, which has a 
large construction sector – were heavily hit by the recession when the financial turmoil 
spread to the real economy. Likewise, some countries the public finances of which did 
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not permit counter-cyclical fiscal policies, like Greece and Italy, suffered a relatively 
high increase in unemployment; the same may be said of Ireland, where the financial 
sector had been hit with special severity. 
 
 
Figure 1. Employment shares of vulnerable sectors in the countries under analysis and in EU 27. Source:  
www.ec.europa.eu/eurostat. 
 
2. The impact of labour market institutions and policies on 
unemployment during shocks 
Bachmann, Bechara, Kramer and Rzepka
68
 analysed labour market transitions before 
the Great Recession and during the early phase of the crisis. One interesting element of 
this study is that in the period 2008 – 2010 the shock effects exerted by the economic 
and financial crisis seem to go in the same direction across countries, whereas, after 
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2011, the economic consequences of the recession grew divergent across Europe. The 
authors, thus, take into account labour market dynamics in the early phase of the crisis, 
to test the role of worker heterogeneity in the transition probabilities.  
 Through multinomial logit models
69
, the authors estimate the probability of passing 
from one labour market state to the other. They, thus, found that, the early phase of the 
crisis (2008-2010) affected mainly the transitions from employment to unemployment 
(by increasing its rate) and the opposite transition from unemployment to employment 
(by diminishing its rate). The authors also highlight the role of heterogeneity among 
workers: the crisis seems to have hit more severely men, as the gender difference
70
 
declined since 2008, young workers (15 – 24) and medium – skilled persons. Another 
element that was found to be significant is the kind of contract: transitions from 
employment to unemployment increased more strongly for temporary contracts than for 
permanent contracts.  
Although the trend in the sample is the same, the aggregate figures hide country 
heterogeneity; Bachmann and his collegues followed Esping – Andersen in defining 
country clusters: (i) Anglo – Saxon (very flexible labour markets); (ii) Scandinavia 
(high flexibility and high social security); (iii) Continental Europe (low flexibility and 
high social security); (iv) Mediterranean Europe (dual labour markets and low social 
security); (v) Central and Eastern Europe (high flexibility and low social security)
71
.  
Results show that employment stability declined particularly in the Anglo – Saxon 
countries, which also displayed the strongest labour market reaction (the increase in the 
respective transition rate was above average), while in the Mediterranean, Scandinavian 
and CEE countries the probability increased, but to a smaller extent. The Anglo – Saxon 
cluster was singled out also for what concerns the transition probability to inactivity, 
while the opposite happened in the Continental cluster. 
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 with m= 1…j, where y 
is one of the j labour market states (employment, unemployment, self – employment, education and 
inactivity), b is the base category, and X is a vector of explanatory variables. 
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Dal Bianco, Bruno and Signorelli
72
 investigate the interaction between labour market 
institutions and shocks, highlighting that institutions can shape the effects of shocks by 
affecting their impact on unemployment and hysteresis. In particular, through a 
longitudinal panel data analysis on the relationship between the unemployment rate and 
labour market policies
73
, the authors test the following hypothesis: (i) labour market 
policies exert an impact on the level of unemployment; (ii) the country – specific 
severity of the crisis will be a determinant of the long – lasting effect of the crisis on 
unemployment; (iii) the severity of the crisis will moderate the impact of labour market 
policies on unemployment, and vice versa.  
The analysis substantially confirmed the hypothesis: highly generous unemployment 
benefits and the crisis impact with a positive sign on unemployment, although moderate 
levels of benefits may reduce unemployment during a crisis. Turning to ALMPs, 
rotation policies do not seem to have a significant effect on unemployment during a 
crisis, unless they are at a particularly low level: in this case they are detrimental. 
Rehabilitation and training policies, on the contrary, prove particularly effective in 
reducing unemployment when the crisis is very severe.  
Youth unemployment, tested separately by Dal Bianco et al., responds differently to 
labour market policies and crisis: total passive labour market policies are highly 
detrimental for the young if they are too generous, while rotation and start – up policies 
have no effect. On the other hand, similarly to total unemployment, rehabilitation 
policies have a positive unemployment – reducing effect when the policies are not too 
generous and the crisis is particularly severe. 
Eichhorst, Escudero, Marx and Tobin
74
, divide the labour institutions in three groups
75
: 
(i) those related to external flexibility – e.g. dismissal protection, fixed-term 
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The authors define external flexibility as that referred to the labour force: for instance, the external 
numerical flexibility is the possibility to adapt the number id employees to the economic situation, while 
the external functional flexibility refers to the skills of the labour force, educated in such a way to be able 
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employment, temporary agency work; (ii) those related to internal flexibility – e.g. 
working time reductions, wage flexibility and subsidized short-time work schemes; (iii) 
policy/programme buffers – active labour market policies (e.g. employer subsidies, 
placement, training) on one hand, unemployment benefits on the other. 
Regarding external flexibility, the appropriate level of employment protection is a 
popular matter of debate. A certain level of protection is necessary to insure workers 
against arbitrary dismissals and against improper use of temporary and atypical 
contracts; nevertheless, an excessive protection may prevent firms from quickly 
adapting to technological change, consumer demand and economic shocks. 
Although they recognize the importance of EPL and highlight the recent trend in Europe 
towards relaxation of such legislation, Eichhorst et al. find that it does not seem to have 
a direct effect on the management of the crisis. 
Eichhorst et al. also analysed the importance of instruments of internal flexibility during 
the crisis. Measures such as working time reductions and part – time employment have 
been largely used by firms to limit job losses. The use of this kind of instruments did 
not result to be linked to a particular level of employment protection: countries with 
different levels of EPL have experienced similar reductions in the number of hours 
worked. 
Related to the decrease of hours worked, wage flexibility, often in the form of wage 
cuts, is another tool that was used to limit excessive falls in employment during the 
downturn. 
De Serres and Murtin
76
 analysed the effect of some labour market institutions on the 
level and on the volatility of unemployment, to assess whether some policies, aimed at 
decreasing the rate of unemployment, actually increase its volatility. 
                                                                                                                                                                     
to adapt to structural changes. On the other hand, internal flexibility refers to the firm-level: internal 
numerical flexibility is achieved through variations of the working hours rather than through adjustments 
in the number of staff, while internal functional flexibility is the ability to adapt to changing demand with 
a flexible organization of the production process. 
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First of all, the authors split the volatility of unemployment into two components: One 
is the degree of unemployment persistence over time, the other is a measure of “cyclical 
volatility, i.e. the elasticity of the unemployment rate to the output gap
77
.  
Using a wage and price – setting model, the authors estimated the statistical significance 
of some labour market institutions. The replacement rate, the active labour market 
policies, the tax wedge and the union density resulted to be significant determinants of 
the level of unemployment. The duration of unemployment benefits and the level of 
employment protection were found to influence unemployment volatility. Overall, the 
authors’ conclusion is that in the long run weaker labour market institutions tend to 
reduce the volatility of unemployment even though they may increase the short-run 
reactivity of unemployment to shocks. 
There are, however, some institutions whose effect on volatility is ambiguous: a stricter 
employment protection for regular contracts, for instance, seems to decrease cyclical 
volatility, but is associated to a higher persistence of unemployment over time. Active 
labour market policies, instead, are associated with a lower persistence and with a 
higher cyclical volatility
78
. 
 
 
3.  The Okun’s Law during recessions 
Several studies on this topic show that the Okun’s law holds for most cases and thus it 
can be used as a “near – rational rule of thumb”79 for unemployment and GDP forecasts.  
Even before the Great Recession, Lee
80
 argued that, although Okun’s law proves to be 
statistically valid for most countries, the estimates are sensitive to a number of 
elements: the choice of the model, the country in exam and the time sample. In 
particular, the author found that output and unemployment dynamics in Europe have 
changed after the 1970s oil shocks: job losses following a reduction in output seem to 
tend to increase over time and the one – percentage point change in unemployment 
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 More specifically, cyclical volatility is defined as “the capacity of specific institutions to either mitigate 
or amplify the impact of changes in business cycle conditions on unemployment”. 
78
 The two effects tend to cancel out, yielding a virtually neutral effect in terms of total volatility. 
79
Villaverde, Maza (2009) page 295. 
80
 Lee (2000). 
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seems to be associated with a two – percentage point reduction of GDP, rather than 
three, as originally estimated by Okun. These changes have been considered by Lee as 
structural rather than a result of the business cycle, reflecting the persistent rigidities of 
European labour markets, due to the downward inflexibility of wages, high unionization 
and generous unemployment benefit systems. 
Also the already mentioned studies by Cazes, Verick and Al Hussami
81
 and by Owyang 
and Sekhposyan
82
 both highlight the instability of the Okun’s coefficients across time 
and space; Casez et al. analysed the divergence in unemployment rates between the US 
and Europe: while before the Great Recession European labour market institutions were 
considered to be too generous and thus responsible for the higher unemployment rates, 
after 2010 they appeared to be more resilient. In particular, countries like Germany, 
which exploited working hours adjustment mechanisms, registered lower 
unemployment rates. This result, in the opinion of the authors, was due to the greater 
protection offered to workers and job losers. On the other hand, countries that were 
severely hit by the recession, like Spain, experienced an increase in the Okun’s 
coefficient, that departed from pre – crisis levels: the authors argue that this increase 
was due to the high volatility of labour market. 
Casez, Verick and Al Houssami, thus, argue that the Okun’s coefficient is not stable 
over time, but that it is rather influenced by the business cycle. Owyang and 
Sekhposyan
83
 push this hypothesis even further, questioning whether the Okun’s law 
might change permanently. In particular, significant changes seem to coincide with 
recessions. 
Perman and Tavera
84, instead, investigated the convergence of the Okun’s law 
coefficients across European countries to evaluate the asymmetric reactions to 
symmetric euro area shocks. In fact, several countries show an increase in the absolute 
value of the unemployment – output trade off recently; this increase might be explained 
following two hypothesis: (i) European countries have different Okun’s law coefficient 
trends, that stem from country – specific labour market institutions and dynamics; (ii) 
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 Cazes S., Verick S., Al Houssami (2011). 
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 Owyang M.T., Sekhposyan (2012). 
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 Owyang and Sekhposyan’s analysis refers to the United States in a sample period that goes 
from1949:Q1 to 2011:Q4; therefore, it will not be discussed further. For a more detailed discussion about 
this study see Chapter 1. 
84
 Perman, Tavera (2007). 
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the Okun’s law coefficients follow a common trend across European countries, caused 
by the growing integration of labour and product markets and the harmonization of 
macroeconomic policies. To test these hypothesis, the authors perform rolling 
regressions of the coefficients of 17 European countries, including the five countries in 
exam in my work, and examining the convergence through a series of groupings: (i) the 
first group includes all the EC countries; (ii) the second set of grouping is based on the 
level of GNP – high, intermediate and low GNP; (iii) the third is based on geographical 
considerations – Northern, Southern and Western countries; (iv) the last set of groups in 
constructed on the basis of the Bayoumi – Eichengreen classification of European 
countries according to the degree of correlation of demand and supply shocks across 
countries – it distinguishes between core and periphery countries. Despite the number of 
groupings considered, no clear evidence of parallel movements in the estimated values 
of the medium – run coefficients, with the exception of the Western countries (Austria, 
Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg and Netherlands), which exhibit a 
convergence of both short – and medium – term coefficients. The conclusion of this 
study, thus, is that the time evolution of the unemployment – output trade off 
relationship is strongly influenced by country – specific elements, such as labour market 
rigidities, technology adoption rates and product market structure, and, therefore, a 
common symmetric shock on European output results in diverging unemployment rate 
movements across countries.  
Finally, Ball, Leigh and Loungani
85
 report as well the scepticism about the validity of 
Okun’s Law since the wake of the Great Recession: in fact, the authors recognize that 
there seems to be little correlation across countries between decreases in output and 
increases in unemployment during the crisis.  
However, Ball et al. find that claims of a breakdown of the law are exaggerated. The 
motivations given for such an opinion are related to the length of recessions and to 
country – specific coefficients: first of all, the crisis has had different time durations 
across countries; a longer recession implies a larger rise in unemployment. An example 
of this fact is the exceptional unemployment dynamics of Spain, in which the recession 
lasted for six quarters.  
The second element taken into account by Ball and his collegues is the country – 
specificity of Okun’s Law coefficients: some coutries have a larger coefficient (     
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therefore a larger increase in unemployment is exactly what had to be expected in 
comparison to countries with a lower coefficient. The underlying determinants of 
country – specific coefficients seem to be strongly correlated to those which influence 
average unemployment, however Ball et al.’s results about them are largely negative. 
The only quite robust finding concerns Spain: the natural explanation for the unusually 
high coefficient of this country seems to be the high incidence of temporary contracts. 
Fixed – term contracts might make adjustment easier for firms when output changes; 
moreover temporary contracts do not have the (high, as demonstrated by OECD EPL 
index) level of protection of permanent contracts. This fact would raise the Okun 
coefficient, justifying the greater reaction of Spain to the Great Recession.  
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Chapter 1: The main labour market reforms in selected European 
countries: A review 
Introduction: Labour market conditions and policies in the EU 
Although labour market policies are set at national level, the membership in the 
European Union influences the governments about several aspects.  
As noted by Bertola
86
, the European Economic and Monetary Union stimulates the 
performance of labour markets, fostering wage coordination, employees’ mobility and 
employment efficiency, but it can also increase the elasticity of labour demand, causing 
more serious jobs losses in case of shocks, while deregulation can be politically difficult 
to implement, especially where redistributive issues are addressed through employment 
policies. Therefore, the European countries still have very different preferences and 
necessities, which make it difficult to find a “one-fits-all” model of labour market 
strategy. 
Nevertheless, the European Employment Strategy
87
 (EES), introduced in 1992 with the 
treaty of Maastricht, sets the explicit, though general, goal of “the creation of more and 
better jobs throughout the EU”. The strategy is currently part of the Europe 2020 growth 
strategy and is implemented through the European Semester
88
. 
As it is stated in the webpage of the Strategy, “… the implementation of the EES - 
supported by the work of the Employment committee - involves the following four steps 
of the European Semester: 
2. Employment guidelines are common priorities and targets for employment policies 
proposed by the Commission, agreed by national governments and adopted by the 
EU Council. 
3. The Joint employment report (JER) is based on (a) the assessment of the employment 
situation in Europe (b) the implementation of the Employment Guidelines and (c) an 
assessment of the Scoreboard of key employment and social indicators. It is published 
by Commission and adopted by the EU Council. 
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 Bertola (2008). 
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 The EES can be consulted at http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=101&langId=en. 
88
 During the European Semester governments seek a closer coordination among member states and EU 
institutions.  
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4. National Reform Programmes (NRPs) are submitted by national governments and 
analysed by the Commission for compliance with Europe 2020. 
5. Based on the assessment of the NRPs the Commission publishes a series of Country 
reports, analyzing Member States' economic policies and issues Country-specific 
recommendations.”89 
In particular, the Employment Guidelines, created in 2005, renewed in 2010 after the 
launch of the 2020 agenda and updated in March 2015, support “smart, sustainable and 
inclusive growth” and are the common base upon which country-specific 
recommendations are formulated. Here is a brief presentation of the guidelines: 
 Increasing labour market participation 
 Developing a skilled labour force 
 Improving education and training systems 
 Promoting social inclusion 
 Boosting labour demand 
 Enhancing labour and skills supply 
 Improving the functioning of the labour market 
 Enhancing fairness, fighting poverty and promoting equal opportunities. 
Moreover, the Europe 2020 agenda sets a specific employment goal, i.e. to employ at 
least the 75% of the 20 – 64 year olds, and a flagship initiative, “Youth on the Move”, 
to foster the education, the employment and the training of young people. 
Finally, after the latest recession, the idea of the European unemployment insurance has 
resurfaced, as the crisis highlighted one of the flaws of EMU, i.e. the lack of fiscal 
coordination and solidarity among its members (Fattibene, 2015). 
The origin of this project actually dates back to the 1970s: the Marjolin Report
90
 already 
proposed a similar system of fiscal stabilizers as an effective reaction to asymmetric 
shocks. The report proposed a temporary system of Community allowances for the 
unemployed, while a generalized harmonization of national systems was to be prepared. 
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 http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=101&langId=en. 
90
 The report was named after Robert Marjolin (1911-1986), commissioner of Economic and Financial 
Affairs from 1958 to 1967, who chaired the “Economic and monetary Union 1980” study group who 
worked at the report. 
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The Marjolin Report already recognized the European dimension of unemployment, 
especially after the creation of the Community, which caused the quick transmission of 
fluctuations from a country to another. However, it recognized the difficulties of 
harmonizing the various national systems as well. 
In the following thirty years, the situation has changed in many fields; nevertheless the 
project of a European unemployment insurance system, i.e. a system of unemployment 
benefits provided at the European level, has regained popularity. 
Enderlein, Guttenberg and Spiess
91
 argue that some kind of European automatic 
stabilization mechanism is necessary to minimize the impact of shocks in the Euro area, 
as short-term factor mobility is not a viable channel: labour mobility is very low, and 
will remain so in a multi-lingual and multi-cultural currency union; capital mobility, 
instead, is a suboptimal solution, as, even in fully integrated capital markets, a private 
insurance against asymmetric shocks does not allow private agents to internalize 
externalities. 
The authors also note that, in EMU, persist different growth rates and inflation 
differentials, which are the causes for the slow adjustments of European countries to 
their unsynchronized business cycles. A cyclical shock insurance system would lead to 
more synchronized business cycles and to more rapid adjustments to asymmetric 
shocks. 
Citing the Four Presidents’ Report92, such a mechanism should (i) It should not lead to 
permanent transfers between countries or to transfers in one direction only,; (ii) It 
should neither undermine the incentives for sound fiscal policy-making at the national 
level, nor the incentives to address national structural weaknesses; (iii) It should be 
developed within the framework of the European Union; (iv) t should not be an 
instrument for crisis management. The European Stability Mechanism (ESM) already 
performs that function. Instead, its role should be to improve the overall economic 
resilience of EMU and individual euro area countries. 
Enderlein, Guttenberg and Spiess propose a Cyclical Shock Insurance scheme (CSI) 
that satisfies these conditions. The authors start from the idea of reducing the difference 
                                                         
91
 Enderlein, Guttenberg, Spiess (2013). 
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 Juncker J.C. in collaboration with Tusk, Dijsselbloem, Draghi, Schulz (2015). 
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between individual member states’ business cycle positions and that of the EMU in 
order to achieve a higher level of convergence, which would smooth the adjustments to 
asymmetric shocks. If a country’s GDP is above its potential output, there is a rise in 
inflation; if, on the contrary, total output id below potential, unemployment increases 
more than necessary. The aim of fiscal policy is to keep the output gap small in absolute 
terms, as neither of the two situations described above is desirable.  
In a currency union like the EMU, an asymmetric shock – which only affects a part of 
the union – output gaps diverge and they cannot be stabilized through individual 
monetary policies. At this point, the necessity for a common fiscal stabilizer to bring 
output gaps back close together. 
The formula to calculate the amount of transfers to each individual country is based on 
the output gap
93
, as the authors indicate it as the cleanest measure of the business cycle 
position of a country. Moreover, the output gap is already used both at the European and 
at the national level to elaborate economic forecasts. 
Against the same backdrop, Jara and Sutherland
94
 argue that a European unemployment 
benefit system would grant greater risk sharing across member states, thus providing 
better shock absorption against asymmetric economic fluctuations. In fact, national 
unemployment benefit schemes vary greatly across countries, in particular concerning 
the following dimensions: (i) eligibility in terms of minimum required amount of work 
or contributions; (ii) eligibility in terms of other conditions – e.g. employment status, 
type of contract, age and so on; (iii) level of payments – flat rate or proportional to 
previous income; (iv) duration of the entitlements; (v) the existence or otherwise of an 
unemployment assistance scheme. The EMU unemployment benefit system that Jara 
and Sutherland suggest would reduce these differences, leveling up the extent of 
protection for the unemployed, thus helping to smooth also the reactions to economic 
shocks
95
.  
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 The output gap is the difference between a country’s GDP – gross domestic product – and its potential 
output – the highest level of output that is sustainable in the long term. 
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 Jara, Sutherland (2013). 
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 This effect has been measured by Jara and Sutherland through the following “income stabilization 
coefficient”:      
    
    
    
   
  
    
    
   
   
  
 where    is the income available for household i before and after the 
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The system proposed by the authors is available for all employed and self – employed96 
up to 64 years old who have work contributions for at least 3 months in the previous 12. 
The payments are provided from the 4
th
 month, up to the 12
th
. For what concerns the 
replacement rates, the authors propose two models: the first is a flat – rate payment, 
amounting to 33% of the average income in the country the unemployed lives; the 
second follows a proportional formula: the replacement rate amounts to 50% of the 
previous gross earning. In both cases the authors do not propose floors or ceilings. 
To evaluate the additional effects of their EMU unemployment benefit system (EMU – 
UI), Jara and Sutherland use EUROMOD, i.e. a tax – benefit microsimulation model of 
the EU, based on micro – data representative of households in each member state, 
recalculating the available income for households with the EMU – UI, both for the flat – 
rate and the proportional formula: the sample includes 10 EMU states, among which 
Germany,  France, Italy and Spain. 
The results of the analysis show, first of all, that the coverage rate of the EMU – UI is 
higher than that of national systems; Italy stands out with a 21% increase in the 
coverage rate, due to the large proportion of self – employed, excluded from the 
national unemployment benefit scheme. The increases in the other countries are 
significant, though smaller. 
Turning to replacement rates, the EMU – UI increases the protection to household 
incomes: in all countries the additional benefit has a positive effect, although in some 
countries, like France, the effect is quite small. The authors also found that the payment 
calculation formula matters: the effect is larger under the proportional scheme. The 
EMU – UI also reduces the dispersion of net replacement rates. 
  
                                                                                                                                                                     
transition to unemployment and    is the market income of household i before and after the transition to 
unemployment. 
96
 Self – employed are excluded from unemployment insurance systems in most countries. 
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Country-specific policies 
1. Germany 
1.1. German labour market after the reunification 
For years, Germany was considered the “sick man of Europe”,  the best example of 
Eurosclerosis, suffering from low productivity and growth, low rates of participation in 
the labour market, high unemployment. After the reunification in 1989, the situation of 
employment in Germany grew worse (Table 1): labour force suddenly increased 
because of low skilled workers coming from the East, creating high unemployment and 
downward pressure on real wages (Akyol, Neugart, Pichler – 2013)97. Moreover, after 
the collapse of communism, civil wars in Yugoslavia led a large flux of refugees in 
Germany. 
 
 
 
Table 4. Unemployment in Germany before and after the Hartz reforms as a percentage of active 
population.Source: OECD.org/employment/labour-stats/ 
 
                                                         
97
 Akyol, Neugart, Pilcher (2013). 
The authors single out a decline in real wages about two years before the employment rate started to rise. 
They impute this decrease in wages to a strong decline in union power since the mid-1990s. The Hartz 
reforms may have further weakened the role of collective bargaining. 
Time Unemployment rate in 
Germany (%) 
1989 5.3 
1993 7.9 
1997 9.8 
1998 9.2 
1999 8.4 
2003 9.6 
2007 8.7 
2011 5.8 
2014 5.0 
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Since Germany is a constitutionally social state
98
, a growing share of social assistance 
expenditure was devoted to unemployment benefits and long-term care. The 
expenditure on labour market policies passed from 1.87% of GDP in 1989 to 3.89% in 
1993 and remained above 3% until 2005.  
German welfare system consisted of a rather generous unemployment benfit scheme, 
which paid 60% of lost net earnings to singles and 67% to parents with dependent 
children, funded through contributions, and of a means-tested unemployment assistance 
scheme for those who either exhausted their benefit duration or who had never reached 
a sufficient amount of contributions. This second kind of benefit was funded through 
general taxation. 
Besides long-term unemployed, also refugees coming from Yugoslavia could claim for 
benefits. The generosity of the scheme plus the number of people who could claim for 
benefits caused major fiscal crisis in local governments.  
Moreover, German labour market suffered from two other sources of rigidity: a very 
high degree of union density and a strict employment protection legislation, which 
caused high firing costs. It was noted above how these two elements have a negative 
impact on employment, as they change firms’ hiring behaviour.  
Finally, the Federal Employment Agency was historically inefficient, both from a job-
matching and from an organizational point of view.  
The first reaction to this situation was, in 1996, the so-called Sparpaket, which 
deregulated and liberalized temporary contracts. It was the first step towards the 
flexicurity paradigm, although it was insufficient to solve the high unemployment 
problem. At the beginning of the 21
st
 century, in fact, Germany was still in stagnation, 
with a declining economic performance and high unemployment rates. 
In the meanwhile, the Maastricht criteria and the Growth and Stability Pact set further 
constraints to Germany’s possibilities of an expansive monoeuvre, and shortly later the 
monetary sovereignty was transferred at the European Union level, preventing, 
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 In fact, German constitution states: “The Federation shall be responsible for subsidies toward meeting 
the costs of social security, including unemployment insurance and public assistance to the unemployed.” 
Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany in the revised version published in the Federal Law 
Gazette Part III, classification number 100-1, as last amended by the Act of 11 July 2012 (Federal Law 
Gazette I p. 1478). 
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therefore, the government from acting on exchange rates to try to regain 
competitiveness. 
 
 
1.2. The Hartz reforms 
After the Placement Scandal
99
 (Vermittlungs Skandal), the chancellor Schr der100 set up 
the Hartz
101
 Commission to analyze the German labour market and suggest policies to 
reform it. In 2002 the commission presented its report, which was translated, between 
2003 and 2005, into the four so-called Hartz reformen
102
. 
The main aims of the reform package were of increasing the efficiency of the matching 
process and of reorganizing the Federal Employment Agency, as required by the public 
opinion after the scandal. In addition, the government implemented also a series of 
activation policies (ALMPs), on the backdrop of EU’s Lisbon Strategy103, to finally 
decrease the high unemployment rate and increase the employment rate, and completely 
reformed the benefit system to avoid fiscal crisis on one hand, and to create incentives 
to returning to work on the other. 
                                                         
99
 In 2001, an investigation about the statistics of the Federal Employment Agency revealed that, while 
the official placement rate was of 50%, the real rate was somewhere close to 17% instead. This scandal 
highlighted the inefficiencies of the Agency and called for a deep reform. 
100
 Gerhard Schröder was Chancellor from 1998 to 2005, after Helmut Kohl and before Angela Merkel, 
with a coalition between the Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (SPD), his party, and the Bündnis 
90/Die Grünen (Green). 
101
 Named after Peter Hartz, chairman of the Commission, adviser of chancellor Shröder and human 
resources executive at Volkswagen AG until 2005. The commission was formed by: Norbert 
Bensel, Jobst Fiedler, Heinz Fischer, Peter Gasse, Peter Hartz, Werner Jann, Peter Kraljic, Isolde Kunkel-
Weber, Klaus Luft, Harald Schartau, Wilhelm Schickler Hanns-Eberhard Schleyer, Günther Schmid, 
Wolfgang Tiefensee, Eggert Voscherau. 
102
 Laws for Reform of the Job Market.  
103
 The employment goal set within the Lisbon Strategy was of increasing employed population to 70% in 
2010. Since the goal was not reached it has been proposed again in Europe 2020 agenda. 
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The contents of the four acts are briefly illustrated in Table 5. 
 
Table 5: contents of the Hartz packages Subject 
Hartz I (2002) De-regulation of employment contracts (e.g. 
agency work and temporary contracts) 
Hartz II (2002) Reform and facilitation of minor employment 
Hartz III (2003) Reorganization of the Federal Employment 
Agency 
Hartz IV (2004) Unification of unemployment and social 
assistance into one comprehensive relief 
scheme 
Source: Alber, Heisig (2011), personal elaboration. 
 
The guiding strategy was threefold: (i) improving job matching and the related strategy, 
(ii) activating the unemployed through a “rights & duties” system, (iii) fostering 
employment demand. 
 
Hartz I 
With this first act, effective from 2003, hiring procedures were reformed and simplified: 
job centres were created in the form of one-stop customer centres that bundle all labour-
related services, like counseling, social welfare and youth welfare. Job centres can now 
contract out training and job creating to Personal-Service-Agentur, i.e. private agencies 
that provide temporary employment. The Hartz I act introduced also training and 
placement vouchers, through which the jobseeker can mandate private agencies to find 
him/her a job.  
Finally, the act tightened the definition of suitable work and reinforced the sanction 
system to activate jobseekers. In particular, jobseekers that are out of work for more 
than a year are obliged to take up any job regardless of the wage level; otherwise the 
unemployment benefit can be withdrawn for a period of three to 12 weeks. 
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Hartz II 
The Hartz II act (2003) was all about activation of the unemployed. First of all, the act 
introduced a start-up grant, called Ich AG
104
 (literally Me Inc) to encourage self-
employment as a way out of unemployment. The programme consists in a decreasing
105
 
contribution paid to jobseekers entitled for employment benefits or participating in a job 
creating programme. The contribution is paid for up to three years, as long as the 
income is below 25000€.  
Two other instruments of activation introduced by Hartz II are Mini- and Midi-Jobs, 
designed not only for jobseekers, but also for low-wage earners. Mini-Jobs are those 
paid up to 400€ and are tax- and social-contribution-free for employees. Midi-Jobs are 
those paid 400.01€ to 800€, for which employees pay increasing social insurance, from 
4% to the normal percentage of 21%. 
 
Hartz III 
The Hartz III act, effective from January 2004, reformed the Federal Employment 
Agency, after the Vermittlungs Skandal that highlighted the inefficiency of the former 
organization. Before the reform, in fact, the Agency was administered by tripartite 
system, consisting in a committee of 50 people. The same committee elected the 
executive board that was in charge of the operational business administration, while 
daily operations were dealt with by civil servants.  
This structure was closely linked to politics and was not enough independent and 
efficient, as was demonstrated by the scandal. Therefore, the administration was made 
more business-like and autonomous: a chief executive officer and a management board 
dealing with management plus a supervisory board. Management is organized on the 
basis of objectives agreed by the Ministry of Economics and Labour and the Public 
Employment Service, as the Federal Employment Agency is now called. The same 
objectives rule the work of the 180 district offices on the German territory. 
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 The official name is Existenzgründungszuschuss, grant for setting up businesses. 
105
 The contribution is of 600€ per month for the first year, 360€ for the second and 240€ for the third. 
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Finally, market mechanisms and the contracting-out of services have increased, 
improving quality and competitiveness and creating a stronger public-private mix to 
provide placement services. 
 
Hartz IV 
The Hartz IV act, released in 2005, completely reorganized and reformed the 
unemployment benefit and the social assistance systems. 
As already mentioned above, the German welfare scheme was considered to be too 
generous and disincentive: in fact, employers and employees paid 3.25% each of the 
gross salary to employment insurance funds. In case of unemployment, employees 
received 60 to 67% of their last-earned salary for up to 32 months. After this period had 
expired, the jobseeker received a means-tested unemployment benefit, consisting of 53 
to 57% of their last-earned net income, through a benefit that was tax-financed and paid 
for an unlimited period.  
After the reform, the period in which the jobseeker receives the income-related benefit, 
now called Arbeitslosengeld I (unemployment benefit I), has been limited to 12 months 
(18 months for workers over 55). This benefit’s level is earning-related. After its expiry, 
jobseekers receive a flat-rate benefit, called Arbeitslosengeld II (unemployment benefit 
II), whose amount is fixed at the former social assistance rate and is independent from 
former income. Jobseekers receiving ALGII must accept reasonable offers of 
employment; otherwise their benefit is reduced. Social assistance is now limited to 
people unable to work. The resulting benefit level is lower, thus it should make re-
employment more profitable than staying on welfare.  
 
1.3. Present conditions 
As noted above, during the 1990s Germany was considered the “sick man of Europe”, 
the symbol of Eurosclerosis, affected by high unemployment and low growth.  
After the Hartz reforms, the situation changed dramatically: Employment rose sharply 
and remained very high even during latest recession. In 2014 the employment rate was 
73.8%, while the European average was only of 64.8%.  
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Hartz IV, in particular, seems to have fully achieved its goal: As Krebs and Scheffel
106
 
found the reform reduced the non-cyclical component of unemployment, through the 
reduction of unemployment benefits, which created an increased incentive to search for 
new jobs. 
Hartz IV also increased the growth rate (annual long-.run growth rate increased of about 
0.1%). Krebs and Scheffel highlight two reasons for this: the increase in employment 
directly expanded output, while the higher investments in human capital stimulates 
growth, especially as labour taxes can be reduced. 
Nevertheless, Hartz IV creates winners and losers: the substantial reduction of the level 
of unemployment benefits, in fact, affected particularly the long-term unemployed, who 
saw a quite large cut to their income source. This effect is in line with economic 
theory’s predictions.  On the other hand, employed households gained from the 
reduction of benefits because the social security taxes declined correspondently.  
Moreover, Hartz IV determined a decline in real wages, which on the one hand reduced 
employees’ income, but on the other increased German international trade 
competitiveness. Arent and Nagl
107
 show that the decrease in unemployment benefits 
(especially in ALGII) weakened the bargaining position of workers, thus determining a 
decrease of wages as well. This could be another reason for the rise in employment, as 
lower wages increase labour supply. 
The combined effect of the other three Hartz acts has sped up the matching process, thus 
increasing employment in their turn. Fahr and Sunde
108
, using empirical matching 
functions to evaluate the determinants of employment inflows, found that the first two 
Hartz acts, implemented simultaneously, increased the job finding rate by between 5 
and 15%, depending on the type of occupation, while Hartz III accounts for another 
15%. The data are particularly spectacular for the long-term unemployed. 
In sum, it can be affirmed that the Hartz reforms have actually reduced the non-cyclical 
components of unemployment, also protecting German labour market from the recent 
Great Recession, thanks to enhanced flexibility and the creation of a new steady-state 
level of unemployment, which cushioned the effects of the crisis.  
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While the macroeconomic results of the Hartz reforms seem to be clearly positive, the 
microeconomic evaluation is more difficult. As Akyol, Neugart and Pilcher
109
 observed 
it is difficult to identify any single successful policy, despite the positive aggregate data. 
The results of the authors’ analysis is reported in Table 6. 
 
Table 6: analysis of the Hartz reforms. Source: Akyol, Neugart, Pilcher (2013). 
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A possible reason for the difficulty in evaluating the single reforms is actually the lack 
of sound control groups and reliable empirical estimations, caused also by changes in 
data definitions and measurement procedures. Nevertheless the reforms have been 
evaluated in several studies using propensity score matching technique, which basically 
compares two similar statistical groups, one treated, the other not treated, and 
difference-in –differences approach, which compares treated individuals before and 
after the reform. 
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2.  France 
2.1. The reforms of the 1990s 
During the 1980s and the 1990s France experienced high and growing rates of 
unemployment (Table 7). To address this issue, France has reformed its labour market 
over the years, introducing flexibility, popular as an unemployment-reducing device in 
Europe in that period. 
However, flexibility was mainly introduced at the margin, thus creating a two-tier 
segmented labour market, with long-term contracts benefiting from high employment 
protection and short-term contracts with little or no protection at all. 
 
Time Unemployment in 
France (%) 
1990 9.4 
1993 11.3 
1997 12.6 
2000 10.2 
2003 8.6 
2011 8.8 
2014 10.3 
Table 7. Unemployment in France as a percentage of active population. Source: ILO.org/ilostat using 
LFS. 
 
The reform process was not a single articulated body like the Hartz reforms in 
Germany, rather a series of particular dispositions mostly about different forms of 
contract. 
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The contrat à durée déterminée 
While the open-ended contract
110
 (contrat à durée indéterminée – CDI) is the normal 
labour contract, the contrat à durée déterminée
111
 (CDD) is intended by French labour 
law
112
 to be used in particular cases, specified by the code. In particular, these cases are: 
(i) the replacement of a worker who is absent; (ii) for a temporary increase of the 
activity of the firm; (iii) for seasonal activities
113
.  
The law establishes that this kind of contract cannot be renewed more than two times 
and that the maximum cumulative duration of successive contracts cannot exceed 18 
months.  
 
The Delalande tax changes in 1992 and 1998 
The contribution Delalande, introduced in 1987, is a tax that has to be paid by 
companies laying off workers above 50 years old. It only concerns private-sector 
workers employed under an indefinite term contract, and is proportional to the gross 
wage of the worker. 
Originally, the tax was introduced to restore the employment protection of older worker, 
after the suppression of the administrative authorization that used to be required for 
layoffs, in 1986. In fact, without the authorizations, firms found less costly to fire older 
workers, instead of involving them in early retirement schemes, and therefore turned to 
layoffs. 
                                                         
110
 « Le contrat de travail à durée indéterminée (CDI) est la forme normale et générale de la relation de 
travail. Par définition, il ne prévoit pas la date à laquelle il prend fin. Il peut être rompu sur décision 
unilatérale soit de l’employeur (licenciement pour motif personnel ou pour motif économique, mise à la 
retraite), soit du salarié (démission, départ à la retraite), ou encore pour une cause extérieure aux parties 
(ex : cas de force majeure). Sa rupture peut aussi résulter d’un accord des deux parties élaboré dans le 
cadre du dispositif de « rupture conventionnelle » mis en place par la loi n° 2008-596 du 25 juin 2008. 
111
 First introduced in 1979, then several times reformed in the framework of updating of the labour law. 
112
 Code du Travail, articles L.1241-1 to L.1248-11.» Extract from the website of the Ministry of 
Employment,http://travail-emploi.gouv.fr/informations-pratiques,89/les-fiches-pratiques-du-droit-
du,91/contrats,109/le-contrat-de-travail-a-duree,3932.html. 
113
 L. 1242-2, Code du Travail. 
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In 1992 the schedule of the tax was changed: workers above 50 hired before this age or 
employed for less than three months if hired after 50, are now liable for the tax, and the 
amount due in case of layoff varies with age. 
The rationale for these changes is the effort of the French government to increase the 
employment rate of older workers, extending their career life, also foreseeing a severe 
slowdown of growth. 
In 1998 the tax schedule was extended to firms with more than 50 workers. 
Behaghel, Crépon and Sédillot
114
 observed that the Delalande tax creates difficulties for 
men aged more than 50 to be hired, compared to their younger counterparts, while the 
effects on women are more difficult to detect. The probability of being laid off at 50 or 
more seems to be decreasing, but this fact is probably due to the higher selection of 
workers. 
The authors, therefore, conclude that the main effect of the Delalande tax, and inferring, 
of employment protection in general, is to deteriorate the hiring probabilities of the 
target group, while the effects on layoffs are more difficult to detect. 
In 2006, a particular CDD was introduced for older workers, aged more than 57 years 
old. This contract is designed to ease the reintegration into active labour force of older 
workers. 
 
The Contrat d’Insertion Professionelle  
At the beginning of the 1990s, France suffered from an exceptional high rate of youth 
unemployment, depending both on structural and cyclical causes: on one hand the 
minimum wage and the comparatively high cost of unskilled labour, on the other tight 
macroeconomic policies (necessary to meet the Maastricht criteria) and the then-current 
conjuncture. 
 The issue was faced by the government Balladur
115
 in 1994: a new type of contract was 
introduced for the young, the so-called contrat d’insertion professionelle (professional 
insertion contract – CIP), which allowed employers to pay young workers 80% of 
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 Behaghel, Crépon, Sédillot (2005). 
115
 Édouard Balladur, French Prime Minister from 1993 to 1995, member of the party Union pur la 
France, UPF. 
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France’s minimum wage116 for up to two years, regardless of the employees’ 
qualifications and without any compulsory training to be provided. 
Since France is traditionally a highly centralized state, the five-year labour law, in 
which the CIP was foreseen, was elaborated mainly by the government and by the 
Ministry for Labour and Social Affairs, without a “concertation” approach. 
The CIP was considered by social partners substantially a SMIC dedicated to young 
people, which risked of having dramatic substitution effects, to the detriment of older 
low skilled workers. Moreover, the CIP did no distinction on the basis of qualifications: 
unqualified teenagers and graduated people in their twenties were treated the same way. 
The protests were quite violent, and resulted in a series of government concessions: at 
first the government tightened the rules on training, making it compulsory for 15% of 
the contract; the wage was not calculated on SMIC anymore, but on reference salary of 
each branch of industry instead.  A new decree was published, and contained also 
another concession: 20% of the duration of contract must be dedicated to “practical 
training”. 
After a setback in local elections of March 1994, the prime Minister choose the strategy 
of trying to please his electorate, and released a further decree, that replaced the CIP 
with a 1000 – franc subsidy to be paid to companies that hired young workers. Later 
during that year the subsidy was increased and an agreement was signed about 
apprenticeship contracts, while the CIP was repealed. 
 
2.2. The reforms after 2000 
Particular forms of fixed-term contracts 
Besides this general CDD, some particular forms were introduced between 2006 and 
2008. The contrat d’usage is a fixed-term contract linked to a particular task to be 
accomplished, more flexible than the “normal” CDD. Workers are not hired on 
permanent contract because of the nature of the task to be accomplished. This kind of 
                                                         
116
 SMIC – Salaire minimum interprofessionel de croissance, introduced in 1950 and reformed 
various times. Currently, it must be applied to every worker aged more than 18 and must be 
recalculated on 1
st
 January each year. In 2014 it was fixed at €9.53 per hour (gross).  
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contract can only be used in sectors indicated in a list provided for by decree or 
collective agreement. 
Moreover, the CDD à objet défini was introduced in 2008. This contract specifies a 
particular task or assignment that the worker must accomplish. Once the job is done the 
contract ends and it cannot be renewed. The duration is between 18 and 36 months. 
The Contrat de Première Embauche 
In 2006, de Villepin
117
 announced a new project to fight youth unemployment: the 
Contrat de Première Embauche (first employment contract).  This new kind of contract 
was designed for workers aged less than 26 and forecasted an initial “trial period” of 
two years, during which the employee could be dismissed without reasons and had right 
to limited compensation. After the trial the layoff is subject to the same rules of CDI
118
. 
The aim of this reform was that of encouraging employers to hire young people by 
softening the very rigid French EPL, introducing flexibility. 
Unions and associations of students harshly criticized the so-called “Kleenex-contract”, 
as they considered it a violation of the basic principles of French labour laws, first of all 
the need of a motive for dismissal of employees. Also, they agreed that such a contract 
would be detrimental for low-skilled young workers. 
Thus, there were very violent protests against this amendment across France, 
accompanied also by strikes and university occupations, until the CPE was withdrawn 
and substituted by new measures. 
 
The Revenu de Solidarité Active  
The Revenu de Solidarité Active (RSA – earned income supplement) was introduced in 
2009 to replace both the minimum integration income (RMI – Revenu Minimum 
d’Insertion) and the single parent allowance119 (API – Allocation Parent Isolé), creating 
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 Dominique Galouzeau de Villepin, French prime minister from 2005 to 2007, member of the UMP, 
Union pour un Mouvement Populaire. 
118
 Contrat à Durée Indeterminée. 
119
 The RMI was a means-tested benefit reserved to jobseekers who are not eligible for unemployment 
benefits. Among the eligibility criteria for this benefit, it is important that the recipient must commit to 
finding a job. The API was designed for parents raising dependent children on their own. It was a means-
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therefore a single means-tested benefit with the objective of making return to work 
always more profitable than staying on welfare. 
Besides these primary benefits, that are national and statutory, there are also the so-
called droits connexes, a wide range of secondary benefits, some of which are local 
and/or non-statutory, such as the Christmas bonus, social tariffs for utilities, housing 
support, school meal allowances or travel benefits. 
In fact, as D. Anne and Y. L’Horty noticed in their analysis120, RMI and API, together 
with the droits connexes, made returning to work unprofitable, as it represented 
basically a loss of income. The exit point from RMI/API was quite low, and, once 
households reached the threshold, local and non-statutory benefits dropped sharply. 
The new scheme, instead, is designed to gradually reduce transfers as earned income 
increases and it sets a higher exit point, so that the fall in local and non-statutory 
transfers occurs later, leaving therefore to households a higher available income. 
Moreover, RSA makes any level of work worthwhile, thus providing strong incentives 
for returning to work, eliminating welfare traps. 
 
Unemployment insurance system reform 
Unemployment benefits are managed by an independent body, Union nationale 
interprofessionnelle pour l’emploi dans l’industrie et le commerce – UNEDIC121, 
controlled by employers and social partners. UNEDIC sets the amounts of the benefits 
and the eligibility criteria through joint meetings every three years. The government 
proposes the agreement to the Parliament, which gives it force by law. Thus, even 
though the agency is officially independent, public institutions have a major role in the 
unemployment benefits system: the financial resources, in fact, are guaranteed by the 
state.  
                                                                                                                                                                     
tested benefit, whose level was calculated on the basis of the income of the recipient and of the number of 
children.  
120
 Anne, L’Horty (2011). 
121
 In 2009, UNEDIC was merged with ANPE (Agence National Pour l’Emploi) to create the new Pôle 
Emploi. 
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Currently, the benefits amount to a 70% replacement income for a maximum duration 
of two years (three for jobseekers aged 50 or more). The system is considered by many, 
among which Égert
122
, to be quite generous. This fact is justified by the aim to ensure 
that jobseekers find an appropriate job for their skills, but Égert suggests that such a 
scheme is coupled with retraining programmes and effective incentives to shorten 
unemployment spells and find a new job as soon as possible. 
Bearing in mind not only the unemployment benefits, but also the RSA and the various 
droits connexes, Égert proposes degressivity and further conditioning on participation in 
training programmes or obligation to take up reasonable job offers. These mechanisms 
should increase incentives to find a new job, reducing the duration of the unemployment 
spell and the amount publicly spent on benefits and ALMP, which in France amounts to 
10% of GDP. 
 
Job centres 
Finally, also France, like Germany with Hartz III, merged the unemployment insurance 
structures (UNEDIC) and the job search assistance in a single centre, called Pôle 
Emploi, thus abolishing the Agence Nationale pour l’Emploi.  
In 2009 public job centres began facing the competition of private agencies. This 
novelty highlighted two characteristics of Pôle Emploi: the assistance is less intensive 
and personalized than the private one, but back-to-work rates are higher. Therefore 
public job centres have to be carefully monitored and empowered to make employment 
services truly effective. 
In 2012 a three-year plan was launched for Pôle Emploi with the goal of making it more 
efficient and of better targeting its interventions. Additional resources will be available, 
while staff will be better employed. In fact, in 2013, a single counselor monitored on 
average 160 jobseekers; the goal is that of reducing this number to about 70 to provide 
jobseekers with more tailored training and job solutions.  
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 Égert (2013). 
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2.3. Current conditions 
As already noted, most of the reforms that were recently undertaken in France have 
introduced flexibility at the margin, creating a segmented labour market. In fact, while 
EPL for permanent jobs has remained almost stable over time, protection of temporary 
contracts has been consistently reduced
123
.  The high level of EPL tends to increase the 
share of temporary jobs, alimenting the two-tier system. Temporary jobs suffer from 
both lower protection and lower wages. 
Another characteristic of STJ in France is a particularly low transformation rate to 
permanent jobs: While in countries with low EPL this rate is quite high (about 50%), in 
France it is below 15%. While the impact is negligible on aggregate employment, this 
excess of labour turnover significantly shortens the job duration for temporary workers. 
Moreover, Blasco and Givord
124
 note that, especially for women, temporary contracts 
do not represent a stepping-stone
125
 towards a permanent job in France; rather they lead 
more often to unemployment or inactivity.  
Since segmentation causes the labour market to function abnormally, it is broadly 
recognized that a change is needed. Le Branchon and Malherbet
126
 (2013) present the 
two most popular proposals in France. 
The first project is lined out in the Accord national interprofessionel (ANI), signed 
between social parts in January 2013, and consists in increasing the employers’ 
contributions to unemployment insurance for short-term contracts
127
. This should spur 
the use of temporary contracts. 
The agreement also deals with the procedure for collective dismissal in large firms, i.e. 
firms with more than 50 employees. Negotiations between the social partners should be 
privileged to shorten and simplify the conciliation; alternatively, the redundancy 
programme has to be presented to the work council and then be homologated. 
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 Le Barbanchon, Malherbet (2013). 
124
 Blasco S., Givord (2007). 
125
 Terminology by Booth et al. 
126
 Le Barbanchon, Malherbet (2013). 
127
 In particular, for contracts whose duration is less than one month the contribution would increase from 
the normal 4% to 7%, while it would be 5.5% for contracts whose duration is one to three months. 
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The second proposal, promoted at European level by several authors, is that of a single 
or unified contract, that would eliminate fixed-term contracts, without increasing the 
EPL level, but introducing the missing element of security besides flexibility. This 
project will be described in greater detail in Chapter 3. 
Despite the controversial effects of partial labour market reforms, as noted by Askenazy 
and Erhel
128
, during the Great Recession, French automatic stabilizers managed to avoid 
excessive harm for households and firms. Social security schemes and cuts on income 
taxes for low-middle-income households cushioned the effects of the crisis. Thanks to 
this quite sound performance, employment and unemployment trends did not follow 
disastrous paths: the unemployment rate remained below the 2-digits threshold, whereas 
in many other European countries the rate grew much higher. 
Flexibility, however, was guaranteed to firms through two channels: first, wages have 
shown a significant downward trend, despite the SMIC; second, firms exploited “time 
saving accounts”129 and short-time work. 
Moreover, the current trend for temporary workers is increasing, affecting especially 
youth employment, while a new trend is emerging in the French labour market 
landscape: a boom of self-employment.  
                                                         
128
 Askenazy, Erhel (2012). 
129
 “Time saving accounts” are arrangements established in the framework of the 35-hour week. During 
times of intense activity, the firm can oblige employees to work additional hours, while during downturns 
workers take up the “saved” vacations. 
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3. Spain 
3.1. The situation after Franco’s regime 
During the 1980s and 1990s Spain suffered from a very high unemployment and from a 
highly dysfunctional labour market. In 1980, the democratic government established the 
Workers’ Statute (Estatuto de los Trabajadores), but kept the employment rules 
established during the Francoist regime
130
, with the aim of a smooth political transition. 
Moreover, the productivity was exceptionally low, TFP growth even negative. Finally, 
Spain had traditionally one of the highest levels in EPL strictness index (OECD), 
ranking 3.9 on 1985 – 1993.  
All these elements contributed to increase the unemployment rate, as shown in table #. 
 
Time 
Unemployment in 
Spain (%) 
1990 16.1 
1993 22.6 
1997 20.7 
2000 13.9 
2003 11.5 
2007 8.2 
2011 21.4 
2014 24.4 
 
Table 8: Unemployment in Spain as a percentage of active population. Source: personal elaboration of 
data from OECD.org/employment/labour-stats/ 
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 Francisco Franco established a fascist regime in 1939, after the Spanish civil war, and remained head 
of the State until his death in 1975. During the Francoist regime, Spain experienced a remarkable 
economic boom, called the Desarollo. In the field of employment policies, there were no particular 
measures, except the Sindacato Vertical, created in 1940, which was the only legal trade union, controlled 
by the regime. 
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Given this situation, Spain was a pioneer in the strategy of flexibility, but introduced it 
at the margin; in 1984 the first forms of atypical contract were introduced. From this 
moment onwards, the Spanish labour market has grown more and more segmented over 
the years, while experiencing the most volatile rate of unemployment in Europe. 
Fixed-term contracts introduced in 1984 allowed firms to hire employees with a lower 
severance pay for any kind of job. The contract duration was between 3 and 6 months, 
with compulsory conversion into permanent contract thereafter. 
Since their introduction, the share of temporary contracts has been very high and 
continuously rising. Therefore, from 1994 onwards a long series of (partial) EPL 
reforms has taken place to limit the number of temporary jobs. 
 
3.2. The reforms 
The Reforma del Estatuto de los Trabajadores 
In 1994, restrictions to the use of temporary jobs were introduced, although temporary 
work agencies have been allowed. The two policies substantially cancelled each other 
out. 
Severance pays for permanent workers were also mildly cut, slightly reducing the gap 
between the firing costs of permanent and temporary jobs. 
 
The Pacto sobre Estabilidad en el Empleo 
In 1997 the employment-promotion permanent contracts were created. These contracts 
were characterized by lower severance payments and were targeted towards to specific 
groups of workers. Besides this contract, in 2002, rebates were applied on contributions 
for firms directly hiring with or converting existing contracts into permanent, even 
though only for a limited period
131
. Despite these measures, the share of temporary jobs 
continued to be extremely high: during the mid-2000s more than 33% of the employees 
had a STJ. 
 
                                                         
131
 Usually 3 years, after the expiration of which the firms often fired workers. 
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The Acuerdo para la Mejora del Crecimiento y el Empleo 
In 2006, the share of temporary contracts in Spain was the highest in Europe: 34.4%. To 
limit this phenomenon, which was creating instability, and to prevent abuse, the 
Government agreed with unions and employers’ organizations about a series of 
measures.  
The main goals of the reform were: (i) better regulation of temporary employment 
agencies and of the related contracts and subcontracts; (ii) incentives for employers to 
grant permanent contracts; (iii) improved management of the Fondo de Garantía 
Salarial (wage guarantee fund). 
Concerning temporary contract chains, the reform established that such a series of 
contracts was automatically converted into a permanent contract if the worker is 
employed for more than 24 months in the same enterprise and for the same mansion, 
simply demonstrating the factual situation. Indirect recruitment, through agencies, is 
considered, while training contracts and internships are not. 
A new kind of temporary contract was introduced for disabled workers. In this case STJ 
were used as means of job creation, since they are precisely targeted: it is the only case 
in Spanish law.  
 
The Medidas Urgentes para la Reforma del Mercado Laboral of 2010 (Ley 35/2010) 
Despite the partiality of these measures, the Spanish labour market experienced a long 
period of expansion, which lasted until 2007. The economic boom was due to low 
interest rates, that eased the access to credit, and to a large immigration inflow, 
especially of low skilled workers, attracted by the specialization of Spain in low value 
added and high labour intensive industries, such as constructions and tourism.  
In 2009, the housing bubble exploded, causing the crisis of the construction sector.  
Unemployment surged to more than 17%, but the Socialist government did not consider 
that a structural reform was necessary. The government changed their mind only in 
2010, after the European Financial Stability Fund was created to limit the sovereign 
debt crises subsequent to the Greek bailout. 
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In February the government issued a set of guidelines for EPL reform to be discussed by 
social partners. The reform covered four key areas: (i) severance pay, (ii) hours 
reduction, (iii) active labour market policies and (iv) collective bargaining
132
. 
Individual dismissals were deeply reformed; first of all, the economic reasons for fair 
dismissal were finally defined
133
. A new employment-promotion contract was 
introduced, with an enlarged group of eligible workers and an express dismissal 
procedure, which consists in a severance pay of 33 days to avoid going to court.  
Also temporary contracts were reformed: now severance pay period progressively 
increases from 8 to 12 days, and the maximum duration of a sequence of temporary 
contracts in a single firm has been set at 3 years. 
Moreover, hours reductions were facilitated, reducing social security contribution on 
firms and extending workers’ entitlements to unemployment benefits. 
Concerning ALMPs, the group of workers eligible for job creation subsidies was 
reduced, while private placement agencies were finally authorized. 
Lastly, firms in distress were authorized to opt out of the collective bargaining process, 
setting agreements with its own employees instead. 
Despite the fact that several aspects of employment were reformed, the system remained 
substantially segmented: the dual EPL system was reformed only marginally, while the 
collective bargaining process was touched only regarding firms in distress. Moreover, 
many measures were designed to benefit incumbent (permanent) workers, leaving 
temporary workers and jobseekers with a very low protection level. 
 
The Medidas Urgentes para la Reforma del Mercado Laboral (Ley 3/2012) 
In February 2012, a new labour market reform was implemented with the aim of 
restoring the competitiveness Spain had lost because of the recession. The new labour 
law mainly addressed collective bargaining and EPL. 
First of all, firm – level bargaining was enhanced, giving the chance to firms to opt out 
of national and regional collective agreements, in order to adjust more closely to 
specific needs, and to exploit internal flexibility as an alternative to job destruction. 
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 Bentolila, Dolado, Jimeno (2012). 
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 Current and expected losses, persistent reduction in revenues, technological, organizational and 
productive reasons. 
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Moreover, the agreements can only be prolonged for a year after their end date; in this 
way, social partners should have more incentives to renegotiate often agreements, in 
order to make them always aligned to current economic conditions. 
Second, in the area of employment protection legislation, the definition of fair 
(individual) dismissal was redefined, particularly for economic reasons
134
. For 
collective redundancies, the need of an administrative authorization was eliminated, 
although it is still compulsory to negotiate with unions before serving individual notice. 
The circumstances under which a collective redundancy can be undertaken was better 
defined. Workers over the age of 50 that are affected by the collective redundancy have 
to be retrained and relocated at the expense of the firm. 
Finally, severance pay for unfair dismissal was reduced to 33 days’ wage per year of 
seniority up to 24 months and the workers’ right to interim wage between the dismissal 
and the final court ruling. 
Dualism, however, remains substantially unaddressed. The reduction of the firing-cost 
gap between permanent and temporary contracts, achieved through the first set of 
measures, is not sufficient to make firms less prone to use STJ in a massive way. 
Currently the unemployment benefit system is considered to be quite generous and 
among the causes of the high job turnover which characterizes Spanish labour market. 
The unemployment insurance is accessible for all employees who involuntary become 
unemployment, provided that they have worked for at least 12 weeks in the previous 72 
weeks. Therefore, voluntary job quitters, individuals receiving full – time disability 
benefits and individuals aged more than 65 are excluded from this benefit. 
The replacement rates are calculated on the average income of the 12 months before 
unemployment: the payment is 70% of the average wage for the first 4 months, 60% 
from the fifth month onwards; the benefit is however subject to limits: it must be always 
be between 75% and 220% of the minimum wage. The maximum duration of the 
unemployment insurance is 24 months. 
Individuals who are not eligible for unemployment insurance or have reached the time 
limit receive the unemployment assistance. 
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 A firm is now said to be in economic distress when it has at least 3 consecutive quarters of decline in 
revenues or income. 
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Both unemployment insurance and assistance are financed through payroll taxes; in 
particular, employers and employees pay UI contributions: in case of permanent 
contract the contribution rate is 7.55% (employees: 1.55%, employers: 6%), for fulltime 
fixed – term it is 8.3% (respectively 1.6% and 6.7%) and 7.7% in case of part – time 
work or temporary agency work. 
Such a generous benefit system was not properly counterbalanced by activation 
measures: since 2002 Spain has pursued a decentralization process, making the 17 
Spanish Autonomous Communities responsible for the ALMP programmes and the 
income support policies. This has mainly created fragmentation and inequality between 
different regions, because the system lacks the coordination necessary for efficiency. 
Moreover, resources allocated by AC to activation and/or support programmes are often 
insufficient and participation very low, thus the impact on welfare dependence, social 
exclusion and poverty is negligible. 
 
3.3. Current conditions 
Even if the Great Recession stimulated the reforming process, the measures remained at 
the margin, thus perpetuating the dual system and the persistent unemployment. 
Academics mostly agree that, as long as the measures will be targeted at the margin, 
they will remain substantially remain ineffective. In particular, as highlighted in the 
OECD preliminary assessment
135
 of the Ley 3/2012, although the reform increased 
dynamism and is likely to bring about lower dualism and faster productivity growth in 
the medium term, the share of temporary contracts remains high and a more decided 
convergence of employers’ costs of termination for permanent and fixed – term 
contracts would be desirable. Finally, the OECD recommends a better integration of 
passive and active policies to increase the effectiveness of Spanish matching process. 
In 2009, 100 academic economists signed a manifesto proposing a single open-ended 
contract, which would suppress once and for all the firing-cost gap and the temporary 
contracts
136
. This new kind of contract would have no ex ante time limit and severance 
payments that increase progressively with seniority. This measure should encourage job 
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creation and longer job duration, while protecting and fostering the creation of human 
capital. 
Besides the single contract, Bentolila et al.
137
 propose other policies that could help 
overcoming the segmentation in the Spanish labour market. First of all the authors 
consider reforming collective bargaining as crucial to improve the development of 
wages; in particular, both real and nominal wage adjustment mechanisms are important 
to restore output, employment and productivity growth: these goals could be better met 
by giving more scope to firm-level bargaining. Bentolila and collegues give also great 
importance to unemployment benefits and to active labour market policies, fields that 
were substantially disregarded by the reforms so far. 
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4. United Kingdom 
4.1. The labour market in the 1990s 
 
Time 
Unemployment rate in the 
United Kingdom (%) 
1990 6.9 
1993 10.2 
1997 6.8 
2000 5.6 
2003 5.0 
2007 5.3 
2011 8.0 
2014 6.1 
Table 9. Unemployment in the United Kingdom as a percentage of active population. Source: personal 
elaboration of data from oecd.org and ec.europa.eu/eurostat. 
 
The Thatcherism 
When Margaret Thatcher
138
 became Prime Minister, despite British unemployment rate 
was modest compared to U.S. and OECD rates (5.3% in 1979), productivity and output 
growth were quite slow, labour costs and inflation were raising and employees were 
relatively less skilled than in other European countries. Thus, during the 1980s, the 
Thatcher government implemented a series of laws and programs related to labour 
market to “cure the British disease”.  
Although no programmatic document exists, some authors, for instance Blanchflower 
and Freeman
139
, highlighted some specific goals: (i) weaken the unions; (ii) make work 
pay, compared to unemployment benefits; (iii) reduce the role of the public sector in 
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 Margaret Thatcher (1925 – 2013), Prime Minister of the United Kingdom from 1979 to 1990 and 
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labour market outcomes; (iv) encourage self-employment. The main aim was of making 
the British labour market more flexible and mobile. 
To achieve these results, the Thatcher government deeply reformed the unemployment 
benefit system, tightening the eligibility criteria and the value of transfers. This made 
working more advantageous over being unemployed, creating strong incentives towards 
employment, thus reducing the unemployment rate and the duration of the spell, which, 
prior to the reform, was exceptionally long, compared to other OECD countries. In 1986 
the Restart programme made interviews with Employment Service mandatory as a 
condition to receive benefits for all those unemployed for more than six months. 
Moreover, measures were introduced to help individuals, including the unemployed, to 
become self-employed, such as secured loans, advice centres, financial incentives 
(Enterprise Allowance Scheme), grants, training programs and tax deductions. While 
the benefit reform actually created incentives to employment, the measures to encourage 
self-employment were of ambiguous success: the proportion of self-employed 
workforce in Britain increased, but there was an increasing flow from self-employment 
to unemployment or inactivity as well. 
Finally, a side-effect of the Thatcher’s reforms was the increase of wage inequality, 
which remained a problem of the British labour market until the 1990s, especially after  
the wage councils (statutory body empowered to fix minimum wages in some 
industries) were abolished in 1993. The introduction of National Minimum Wage, by 
the Labour government of Tony Blair in 1999, slightly improved the situation, 
especially for women. 
 
4.2. The reforms after the Thatcher government 
New Labour 
In 1997 a Labour government was elected, opening an innovative period for the Labour 
Party, called New Labour.  
The main labour market reform of Blair
140
 government was the so-called New Deal for 
the Young Unemployed: all individuals aged between 18 and 24 who have claimed 
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unemployment benefit (Job Seekers Allowance – JSA, introduced in 1996) enter the 
programme: in the first period – Gateway – the claimant is given intensive help with job 
search and is monitored by a personal advisor. If the claimant does not find an 
unsubsidised job during this stage, which lasts up to four months, he/she is given a set 
of New Deal options, including: (i) subsidised training or education for up to 12 
months; (ii) a wage subsidy paid to the employer; (iii) voluntary work for six months, 
paid an allowance at least equal to JSA; (iv) a job on the Environmental Task Force, i.e. 
government provided employment. 
The choice of one of the four options is mandatory and if an option is refused the 
claimant is sanctioned through the withdrawal of benefit for a period of 2 to 13 weeks. 
In certain specific areas, were long-term rate is particularly high, the so-called 
Employment Zones, both public and private employment service agencies provide job 
assistance, monitoring and counselling to New-Deal-eligible clients. 
Van Reenen
141
 analysed the programme to evaluate its effectiveness and found that, 
despite analysis might be biased by substitution effect and by the lack of a truly 
comparable control group, the British New Deals appears to have had significant 
positive effects on young employment. The probabilities for young unemployed to find 
a job have increased considerably, without deteriorating the quality of jobs. 
 
Jobcentre Plus 
In 2001, the Department for Education and Employment and the Department for Social 
Security were merged into the new Department for Work and Pensions. Together with 
the departments, also the placement and benefit administration functions were combined 
as Jobcentre Plus (JCP), which became a one-stop centre that provides both 
employment services and income support for inactive and unemployed customers of 
working age.  
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Work Programme 
Work programme was introduced in 2011, with the aim of creating a welfare scheme 
that protects the most vulnerable without creating unemployment and poverty traps
142
. 
The programme supports return to work for benefit claimants, such as disabled people 
and young low skilled people. Customers are provided with personalized support to 
undertake active and effective job-search. The providers, both public and private, get 
incentives and payment for results, in exchange for innovative approaches in welfare-to-
work schemes.  
 
Universal Credit 
In 2012, in the framework of the Welfare Reform Act, the main means-tested benefits 
were pooled in one single transfer, called Universal Credit. At the same time, support 
for childcare is made more accessible. The Council Tax Benefit will be excluded. 
This reform had as a major aim that of rationalizing the set of benefits, simplifying the 
re-application from one benefit to another and reducing the risk of fraud and error. 
Moreover these measures should decrease the risk of welfare dependence and provide 
better incentives for work:  METR
143
 will decrease, leaving a higher available income 
for recipients that go back to work and lowering the probabilities of in-work poverty. 
For what concerns childcare, it is now accessible for parents regardless of the amount of 
hours per week they work, while in the previous system there was a threshold of 16 
hours. This element has a particular scope regarding child-rearing-aged women, 
although, to really facilitate women’s employment childcare costs should be further 
lowered. 
 
4.3. Present conditions 
The United Kingdom has always been a leading country in both the fields of active 
labour market policies and of flexible labour market; these characteristics allowed the 
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UK to face the Great Recession maintaining a quite high rate of employment, while 
other European countries experienced serious falls. 
In fact, the British labour market has traditionally been very flexible, while real wages 
have been responding quickly to changing productivity and output levels during the 
crisis, limiting the number of layoffs
144
.  
Nevertheless, as in many other European countries, involuntary part-time and fixed-
term jobs have increased significantly and youth unemployment is at a quite high rate.  
Moreover, the recent developments of the labour market, in particular the introduction 
of flexibility, has created a wide income gap between full-time employees and workers 
with part-time, insecure and/or low skilled jobs. Together with the “traditional” drivers 
of inequality, e.g. globalization and technological change, these elements are favouring 
high-skilled workers rather than low-skilled ones. 
Finally, youth unemployment is a major challenge for British policy makers, as young 
people who fall in poverty and social exclusion are likely to permanently remain in this 
situation. Therefore, not only measures have to be introduced to facilitate the entry of 
young jobseekers in the labour market – e.g. apprenticeships, dedicated job 
opportunities and contracts, subsidies and tailored assistance – but there must be a 
strong coordination and collaboration between the educational system and the labour 
market, as to avoid skill deficiencies and improve the matching process.  
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5. Italy 
5.1. The situation in the 1990s 
Italy in the 90s grew very slowly and performed poorly in the labour market: 
traditionally, the participation and the employment rates have been quite low and fell 
steadily during the 90s. Black economy was probably a quite important share of the 
whole, with ISTAT estimating it as a 20-25% of GDP. 
 
Time Unemployment in 
Italy (%) 
1990 9.0 
1993 9.7 
1997 11.2 
2000 10.6 
2003 8.7 
2008 6.1 
2011 8.4 
2014 12.7 
Table 10. Unemployment in Italy as a percentage of active population. Source: personal elaboration of 
data from oecd.org/employment/labour-stats/ and istat.it. 
 
Moreover, the Italian labour market suffered from an additional rigidity, i.e. an 
extremely heavy regulation, made even stronger by the economic situation.  
Finally, the Italian system of social security was limited and inefficient: unemployment 
benefit have always been low (on average 30% of the gross wage, payable for six 
months) and many workers were not eligible for them, while for workers in the 
manufacturing sector the benefit was represented by a short-term replacement wage 
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called cassa integrazione guadagni
145
 (CIG). Therefore, the social safety-net had to be 
reformed and coupled with a set of labour market policies to reduce unemployment. 
 
5.2. The reforms 
The Treu law 
The Treu
146
 law, promulgated in 1997, was the first organic reform of the labour market 
regulation after the introduction of the Labourers Statute (l. 300/1970 - Statuto dei 
lavoratori) in 1970. It was aimed at reducing unemployment, especially in the South of 
Italy (Mezzogiorno), through the introduction of new flexible types of contracts. In 
particular, the package reformed apprenticeship and work-training contracts and 
liberalized temporary contracts.  
The reform can be considered as part of the Italian way toward the European Economic 
and Monetary Union (EMU): the need to meet the Maastricht criteria, the effects of 
European rules and the growing international competition urged for structural reforms 
that could boost Italy’s performance: The Treu law was an important element of this 
process. 
The Treu reform was prepared by the Minister himself together with a cabinet of 
experts, many of which were labour lawyers, and in concertation with the social 
partners, including the representatives of parties. 
The government had to rely on the far-left Rifondazione Comunista for its majority in 
the Chamber of Deputies; this created serious constraints for the reform, especially on 
the side of layoffs. Therefore, Treu and his colleagues focused on the liberalization of 
entry, legalising temporary and agency work. Apprenticeship and on-the-job training 
were reformed as well, while labour grants were made available for young people facing 
their first job. 
                                                         
145
 The CIG is still used and it is funded by private contribution plus complementary statutory 
contributions. It provides a replacement wage, usually 80%, in case of temporary reduction of working 
time or suspension of activity. 
146
 Named after the Italian Minister of Labour and Social Affairs Tiziano Treu, during the government of 
Lamberto Dini (1995 – 1996) and the government Prodi (1996 – 1998). 
Chapter 1 
 
92 
 
The government had also other projects: it committed both with RC and with Europe to 
prepare the transition to a 35-hour work-week and was considering a reform of 
unemployment benefits, jointed with an easing of EPL for permanent workers, but the 
cabinet fell before the bill was presented to the Parliament. 
 
The Biagi law  
Introduced in 2003, the Biagi
147
 reform was targeted on the same disadvantaged social 
group to whom the Treu reform was dedicated: youth, women, older workers and job-
seekers, especially in Southern Italy. The measures already introduced by Minister Treu 
were improved and amplified in the new law. 
The reform was based on three pillars: employability, adaptability and equal 
opportunities. The same concepts were the labour policy guidelines of the European 
Employment Strategy. 
The Biagi law designed a new network of employment services, run by both public and 
private bodies, linked together by an online database, called Borsa nazionale del lavoro. 
Public employment offices provide a wide range of services, e.g. job searching 
assistance, recruitment, career guidance and training and employment agency work, 
sometimes in cooperation, some other in competition, with private-sector agencies. 
Private agencies must be authorized by the Ministry of Labour and Social Policies and 
entered in a national register, i.e. Albo delle agenzie del lavoro, in a particular category, 
depending on the kind of service that the agency provides. 
The online database aims at increasing efficiency and transparency of the labour market. 
It is accessible directly by jobseekers, workers and employers, or through private or 
public employment services. It should favour the matching between supply and demand 
for labour. 
Besides these interventions, the Biagi reform introduced several new forms of contracts, 
with the goals of providing more flexibility both to firms (in case of temporary changes 
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in the activity volume) and to workers (to reconcile personal and family life, or 
education, or responsibility duties, with job), and of regulate some forms of black or 
hidden employment, thus giving workers more protection. Moreover, the new contracts 
were intended to encourage firms to hire and to ease the way to (or back into) labour 
market of school-leavers or long-term unemployed. 
 
Apprenticeship contracts 
These contracts are designed essentially for young jobseekers, graduated or school-
leavers. There are three types of apprentice: Educational training, vocational training, 
and higher-level apprenticeships. They are designed for different age and qualification 
levels, but all consist in training at the employer’s expense in addition to remuneration. 
Educational apprentice contract may last for up to three years, while vocational training 
may last from two to six years. The contract can be terminated by the employer only for 
a just cause. 
 
Access to work contracts 
These contracts are dedicated to young jobseekers, long-term unemployed or 
individuals affected by physical or mental disability, to let them acquire the skills 
required for a certain job. They substitute the old work training contract. The contract’s 
duration may be of nine to 18 months (36 for workers with disabilities). This kind of 
contract cannot be renewed by the same employer, while the worker can take up another 
job with the same contract. 
 
Project work contracts 
This is a kind of quasi-subordinate contract, as it relates to a certain project or task, 
specified in the contract, which is autonomously managed by the worker. It was 
introduced to limit the improper use of such a form of work and to provide more 
protection to workers subject to it. In fact, there are limitations about the sectors in 
which project work contracts can be issued. The contract has to be written and to 
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establish exactly the project (or the part of a project), the payment criteria and times, 
any health and protection measures, and many other details. 
 
Occasional labour 
This form of work is intended particularly for individuals risking social exclusion. It 
enables workers to access the official labour market, leaving behind the hidden 
economy. Mainly these contracts have as an object housework, childcare or assistance 
to older persons, gardening, cleaning, dealing with emergencies and so on. The payment 
system is particular for this kind of jobs: vouchers with an established value must be 
purchased by the employer in advance and given to the employee, who has to present 
them to authorized centres to have the cash and to have social insurance and injury 
insurance contributions paid. The worker cannot work more than 30 days a year and 
he/she cannot earn more than €5000 per year. 
 
Job sharing 
Two (no more) workers can take up an individual employment contract, dividing the 
hours the way they want. The goal of this kind of contract is to give the chance of 
reconciling work with other personal responsibilities. Even if the number of hours must 
be specified in the contract, the workers can organize their working time differently, 
notifying the arrangement to the employer on a weekly basis. If the contract is 
terminated for one of the workers, also the other is automatically dismissed. 
 
On-call work 
This kind of contract is designed to manage intermittent work with flexibility for both 
firms and workers. The worker can agree to work on certain times of the week, of the 
month or of the year. There are two types of on-call work: with or without a stand-by 
allowance. In the second case, the worker gets a monthly allowance, but he/she is 
bounded to accept any offer to work. An unjustified refusal can determine the 
termination of the contract, the repayment of the allowance and damages. 
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Employment agency work 
Through this mechanism a user company can utilise work employed by an agency. The 
channel can be temporary work or staff leasing. In this kind of arrangement, there are 
two contracts: the first takes place between the worker and the agency, the second 
between the agency and the user firm, each of which can be either open- or fixed-term. 
This type of work was designed to allow firms to expand their workforce very quickly 
and flexibly, through a form of outsourcing. The worker is normally paid by the agency, 
but if the latter fails to pay the agreed amount, the worker has to right to demand the 
payment to the user firm. 
 
The Monti – Fornero reform 
In 2012, the technical Monti
148
 government passed a new labour market reform that had 
the explicit intention of overcoming the duality between insiders and outsiders. The 
reform was elaborated on the backdrop of a quite diffused opinion: high unemployment 
rates, especially among the young, and the increased use of atypical and precarious 
contracts are caused by the high levels of protection for workers in salaried (open – 
ended) employment. 
The reform proposed to social partners a more cooperative and collaborative setting for 
the management of the labour market, but the level of social concertation was very 
peripheral, given the opposition of CGIL and Confindustria
149
to this approach. 
The reform touched upon three different areas of intervention: (i) limiting the scope of 
atypical and temporary work; (ii) making dismissal easier, in order to introduce greater 
flexibility in hiring; (iii) renewing the safety – net system. All these measures only 
regard the private sector. Moreover, it must be noted that, soon after the passing of the 
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reform, several amendments were made; thus, the resulting reform is more limited than 
the initial intentions of the government. 
Concerning fixed – term contracts, while the Biagi reform required specific technical, 
productive or organizational reasons to issue such a contract, the Monti – Fornero 
reform aimed at normalizing the recourse to such contracts. Thus, the law introduced a 
new form of temporary contract that can be used in two cases: (i) if the worker is being 
hired for the first time, with a maximum duration of 12 months, no particular reason is 
required; (ii) if the worker is hired under fixed – term contract for an indefinite period, 
no reason is required if the clause is agreed upon in collective agreements, if it involves 
not less than 6% of workers in each production unit and if it is carried out in certain 
organizational processes, e.g. start ups, launch of new products, researches. Employers 
who hire workers on a fixed – term contract are required to pay an additional 
contribution (1.4% of pension – qualifying income) to finance the occupational fund 
(Assicurazione Sociale per l’Impiego), which is reimbursed if the employment 
relationship is converted into a full – time, open – ended contract or the worker is hired 
within six months of the termination on the fixed – term relationship. 
Agency work is regulated almost in the same way as the other forms of fixed – term 
employment: the recourse to agency work is possible providing a justifying reason, save 
for two cases, identical to the ones already cited for fixed – term employment. 
The Monti – Fornero reform considered apprenticeship the pivotal institution for the 
young who first enter the labour market. Therefore, the number of apprentices that an 
employer can recruit was increased and it is calculated on the number of qualified 
workers in employment. In addition, employers with at least ten employees can hire 
apprentices on the condition that they had recruited at least 50% of apprentices whose 
contract ended in the previous 36 months. Finally, apprenticeship contracts should have 
a duration of at least six months, with the exception of seasonal work. 
Concerning dismissals, first of all, the reform changed the procedure: the reason for the 
layoff has to be stated in the communication, while before it was only a right of the 
worker to request it; the term for the contestation of the dismissal has been diminished 
and set to 180 days, from the previous 270. 
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Second, the obligation to re – hire the worker dismissed without a just cause or justified 
reason held now only for discriminatory layoffs; for all the other cases, the worker has 
right only to a pecuniary compensation. 
Finally, the safeguards provided to workers who lose their job are a key aspect of the 
reform, which balance the new measures that provide flexibility in hiring and in 
dismissal. 
The old unemployment benefits and mobility allowances were substituted by a Social 
Insurance for Employment (Assicurazione Sociale per l’Impiego – ASPI) to supply 
income integration and protection to workers in case of job loss. The scope of 
application was widened: all workers are concerned by ASPI with the exception of 
agriculture workers, enrolled in special registers, and inactive people. The benefits 
duration was set to 10 – 16 months, depending on the workers’ age. 
Besides ASPI, the reform also introduced a benefit dedicated to workers who meet only 
some of the eligibility criteria; it is called Mini ASPI. To have access to this benefit, 
workers must have paid social contributions amounting to 13 weeks in the 12 months 
preceding redundancy.  
For both the allowances, the benefit amounted to 75% of the first € 1,195 of wages, 
25% of wages over € 1,195. The maximum allowance was set at € 1,167, and decreased 
by 15% every six months. 
In order to avoid welfare dependence and disincentive towards work, the reform 
introduced a number of conditions to be satisfied to maintain the status of unemployed 
and thus receive the benefits. In particular, benefit recipients must take part to 
interviews, training, active job – search activities and must accept job offers. Unjustified 
refusal to take part in such initiatives or to accept a job may result in the termination of 
benefits. 
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The “Jobs Act” 
In 2014, to react to the high and persistent unemployment caused by the Great 
Recession, the Renzi government
150
 promulgated a new labour market reform, the so 
called Jobs Act.  
The first novelty introduced by this reform is the contratto a tutele crescenti (contract 
with increasing protection), which foresees new procedures for layoffs. While the 
worker dismissed for discriminatory reasons is reintegrated through a judicial decision, 
all the other “unjustified” dismissal cases are now resolved through a monetary 
indemnity, whose amount is based on seniority (two months for every year of work). 
A conciliation agreement is also introduced: in case of layoff, the employer can offer a 
tax-free indemnity to the former employee. By accepting this sum, the worker gives up 
on the judicial recourse.  
The same mechanism (the indemnity) is applied to collective layoffs that do not follow 
the procedures established by law. 
By making the legislation on layoffs less strict, the government intends to lighten EPL, 
thus making firms more prone to hire and creating new jobs. The new contract only 
applies to workers hired after the release of the decree (March 2015). 
Another important novelty introduced by the Jobs Act is the contratto di ricollocamento 
(re-employment contract). Through this contract the jobseeker can get both the income 
support and the assistance he/she needs to find a new job.  
The Regions
151
 offer to the jobseeker a voucher that can be spent for an outplacement 
service. The jobseeker can choose the agency, which can be private or public, in a 
context of quasi-market. This creates a positive competition among agencies that will 
increase their efficiency. 
The voucher has a different value on the basis of the difficulty to place the unemployed, 
but can only be cashed by the agency after placing the jobseeker. 
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The jobseeker is assisted by a tutor, who has also the task of controlling the availability 
of the jobseeker to take up suitable jobs: after one unjustified refusal of a suitable job 
the indemnity for income support is halved, after the second refusal the provision of the 
benefits is interrupted. The unemployed, therefore, is strongly incentive to take up a 
new job as quickly as possible. 
Through this new contract, which combines rights and duties, the spending for passive 
labour market policies could be reduced and spent more effectively. Moreover this 
mechanism has the required characteristics to be funded by the EU, through the 
European Social Fund and the Youth Guarantee Fund. 
Finally, the system of employment services was re-organized: the national system of 
labour policies (Rete Nazionale dei servizi per le politiche del lavoro), consisting of the 
regional bodies for employment (Centri per l’Impiego), the private agencies and the 
social security bodies (INAIL and INPS), together with training institutions, is now 
coordinated by the new agency for ALMP, ANPAL –Agenzia Nazionale per le Politiche 
Attive del Lavoro.  
The private agencies working in the field of employment must be registered in the Albo 
Nazionale dei Soggetti Accreditati a Svolgere Funzioni in Materia di Politiche Attive 
del Lavoro. Another register, Albo Nazionale degli Enti Accreditati a Svolgere Attività 
di Formazione Professionale, will be created to monitor the institutions dealing with 
formation and training. 
The Jobs Act reformed also the unemployment benefits system, introducing a new 
allowance, called NASPI (Nuova Assicurazione Sociale per l’Impiego – new social 
insurance for employment). To be eligible for the allowance, the worker must have paid 
at least 13 weeks of social contributions in the four years before redundancy and 
receives the benefit for half the number of weeks for which social contribution were 
paid, for a maximum of 24 months. The amount was not changed, except for the 
maximum allowance, now set at € 1,300 and for the fact that the benefit decreases by 
3% each month after the fourth. 
The Jobs Act finally provides for two experimental benefits: (i) an unemployment 
benefit for dependent self – employed workers (DIS – COLL - Indennità di 
disoccupazione per i lavoratori con rapporto di collaborazione coordinata e continuativa 
e a progetto);  
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5.3. Current conditions 
The Italian labour market was heavily hit by the Great Recession: employment has been 
decreasing from 2008 to 2013 and has started recovering only in 2014. The employment 
rate is slightly increasing, reaching 55.7% in 2014, but remains well below the 
European average (64.9% in 2014). On the other hand, while in the EU the 
unemployment rate decreases, while in Italy it continues to increase, particularly among 
the young and in the Southern regions (14.9%). 
The rise in the employment rate is the result of various dynamics; in particular the rise 
in the share of workers aged +50, in the participation of women, although the rate 
remains below the EU average, while the employment rate for the young (15-34) is 
continuously decreasing. If, on the one hand employment increases, the share of 
standard contracts continues to fall; atypical and part-time contracts, instead, are 
increasing, contributing to the segmentation in the Italian labour market. 
Thus, involuntary part-time employment increases, together with the flow of people 
who leave inactivity to unemployment and to potential labour force. On the other hand, 
though, also the number of discouraged workers is increasing. 
Concerning the new kind of open-ended contract (contratto a tutele crescenti), it should 
become the normal form of contract for open-ended jobs. The aim of the reform is of 
reducing the segmentation of the Italian labour market and the gap between the (old) 
normal contract (strictly protected) and the various (more than 20) kinds of atypical 
contracts. Nevertheless, Fellini
152
 (2015) estimates that the dualism will increase at least 
in the short term, as a result of the competition between the old contract and the new 
contratto a tutele crescenti. The author, although, expects the new contract to substitute 
the atypical and short-term jobs, at least as an effect of the incentives for open-ended 
hiring.  
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Conclusion 
The vast literature about labour market institutions and policies, partly reviewed in this 
work, demonstrates both at the theoretical and at the empirical level that there is no 
“optimal” labour market: the efficiency of a set of labour market institutions is 
correlated to several country – specific variables, depending both on the labour market 
itself and on the national economic system in general.  
For these reasons, also the instruments of labour economics and statistics, e.g. the 
Beveridge curve or the Okun’s law, need to be completed with country – specific 
characteristics to be significant in the evaluation and in the forecasting about labour 
market conditions. 
On the basis of the theory reviewed and of the historic narration of this work, the 
following overview appears: after the Great Recession, some European labour markets 
appear weak and dysfunctional, while others, which had undergone reforms before the 
downturn, resisted quite well to the consequences of the crisis.  
Flexicurity seemed to be the solution to labour market failures; thus, several countries 
deregulated various forms of temporary and/or atypical contracts.  On the other hand, 
though, flexibility, where it was not linked to an increased security, created dualism and 
precariousness: social security must balance the effects of temporary contracts.  
The aim of the present work is also to analyse and compare the reform paths of selected 
European countries, also considering the EU framework, against the backdrop of the 
literature  labour statistics and econometrics, to evaluate whether and how policies have 
created flexibility and efficiency or, on the contrary, precariousness and dualism. 
Through this analysis, two main positions were recognizable: some countries, namely 
Great Britain and Germany, which had undertaken the reforms before the crisis, seem to 
have contemporary flexible and secure labour markets: unemployment benefits have 
been reorganized and simplified, while activating programmes have been made 
compulsory for benefit recipients in order to avoid welfare dependence and to “make 
work pay”. These initiatives have allowed these countries to better face the 
downturn, keeping the employment rate above the European average. Nevertheless, this 
does not mean that further improvements cannot be made, especially in the field of 
available income for low – wage earners and benefits recipients. 
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Other countries, instead, e.g. France, Spain and Italy, are still in the “flexibility stage”: 
the share of temporary and/or atypical contracts is very high, making the market dual 
and unequal. Moreover, Italy and France have experienced the proliferation of different 
forms of temporary contracts, which increased the precariousness of fixed – term 
workers and the dualism, regarding both employment protection and wage, compared to 
the permanent workers. Thus, governments have reacted, though taking different paths: 
Italy has recently introduced a single contract with increasing protection, while France 
has reorganized its benefit system, increasing the exit point, in order to make work 
profitable also for low income households on welfare. Spain, also given its difficult 
fiscal position, has not undertaken any reform regarding unemployment benefits or 
active labour market policies. However, also in the other two countries, policies in all 
the three areas of intervention (external and internal flexibility and policy buffers) 
should be carefully designed to avoid imbalances.  
Hence, the reforming path in Europe is far from being complete: in the “flexicurity” 
contests, like Germany, the risk is that of in – work poverty, while in Southern Europe 
activation policies are still too weak to insure workers against long – term 
unemployment or precariousness, while unemployment benefit systems should be better 
designed.  
Further analysis is necessary, as there is no “one size fits all” formula: European labour 
markets are very different from each other and are also influenced by other sectors of 
economy and society. Nevertheless, harmonization and some kind of employment 
protection system at the European level might be the future, as global challenges, like 
international competition and global shocks, are the issues that European countries are 
likely to face. 
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